Advisory

MAL-2026-6748

Also known as: None

Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.

Summary

Malicious code in haproxy-config-client (PyPI)

Details

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Source: amazon-inspector (6f86ffde45262c5d45a24458a85116ab5ca80451ce3d3159f9d7cad6599ad145)
setup.py registers install, develop, and egg_info command hooks that run a routine which XOR-0x5A-decodes a list of attacker-controlled Cloudflare Workers hostnames (package-proxy.cf5oobworker.workers.dev and four sibling *.workers.dev hosts) and a URL path (/pkg/package), downloads opaque bytes over HTTPS, writes them to /var/tmp/.cache_<random>, chmods 0755, and spawns the binary detached via subprocess.Popen with start_new_session=True. If HTTPS fetch fails, it falls back to a DNS covert channel: raw DNS TXT queries against *.lin.dl.wel1.ru reassemble a base64 payload from serial subdomain lookups, which is then decoded and executed. All C2 hostnames, the URL path, and dynamic-import module names ('base64', 'b64decode', 'b32encode') are XOR-obfuscated byte literals whose only purpose is to hide the destinations from review. The hook is wired into egg_info as well as install/develop, so the payload fires during pip install and even during metadata-only operations. The package itself has no real functionality — src/haproxy_config_client/__init__.py contains only a __version__ string — and its name plus 'Internal service utilities' summary and 'TBank Engineering' author label are consistent with a dependency-confusion vehicle targeting an internal ops utility.

Source: kam193 (f70d07844bca4fadfcedb195f5768c8a95318af4d62a4bcec94556b99b72c4ad)
During installation the obfuscated code downloads a malicious executable from a remote location. Code is designed to survive different blocks: first, there is an attempt to download the executable from one of five Cloudflare Workers. If it's not successful, the code falls back to download using DNS: first, it gets a TXT record from c.lin.dl.wel1[.]ru. This record returns a number, which is then used to iterate over domains in the form <0...n>.lin.dl.wel1[.]r and reconstruct the encoded executable from their TXT records. The executable is finally saved under a partially random name, executed, and removed after execution. The Linux executable contacts a few domains, but there is no more detailed information about its behavior available.

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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-07-haproxy-config-client

Reasons (based on the campaign):

  • The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
  • Downloads and executes a remote executable.
  • obfuscation
  • dependency-confusion
  • other
  • malware
  • covering-tracks
  • targetted-attack
  • data-stored-in-dns

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-07-03 22:43 UTC
Modified
2026-07-08 21:46 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

haproxy-config-client

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • Versions: 8.5.3

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0

Sources & licences