Advisory

MAL-2026-7017

Also known as: None

Malicious package Its source marks this package as malicious: it is not a vulnerability in a legitimate one.

Summary

Malicious code in logger-daemon-regex (npm)

Details

The npm package logger-daemon-regex is a full-spectrum information stealer and remote-control agent disguised as a "Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge" (all bin names are forge-*).

A postinstall lifecycle hook chains five scripts (postinstall-clipboard-event, ensure-dist, postinstall-durable-materialize, postinstall-bootstrap, postinstall-agent) that stand up a persistent background agent (via pm2 / an autostart CLI) on npm install, before the package is ever imported.

The agent scans the filesystem for a curated crypto-focused target list (shipped as secret_filename_patterns.json): wallet files (wallet.dat, *.wallet, keypair.json, new_keypair.json), seed phrases (*.mnemonic, *.seed, *.phrase), key material (*.pk/p8/p12/pfx/jks/keystore, UTC--* Ethereum keystores, id.json Solana keypairs), and general secrets (.env*, secrets.json, keys.txt) across chain directories (.solana, .ethereum, .bitcoin, .web3, .keystore). It also harvests browser-extension databases, captures keyboard input and the clipboard, takes periodic screenshots, and exposes a remote file explorer / control channel (relayServer/relayAgent/fsProtocol). Crypto-seed dependencies @scure/bip39 and tweetnacl corroborate the wallet-theft intent.

Harvested data is archived and exfiltrated via Hugging Face Hub uploads (@huggingface/hub, using an hf_ token) and Discord webhooks.
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

Source: amazon-inspector (867d520b17da5e885d1a1e1e954cbf9eaf045b55a28307319f4fbad27846b8a9)
package.json advertises the package as a 'Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge' but the shipped code is a full information-stealer / remote-access implant. On npm install, scripts.postinstall chains scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs, which (a) copies dist/ into a hidden per-user runtime prefix at <userdata>/.logger-daemon-regex/runtime/v<version>/ so the agent survives npm uninstall, (b) registers OS autostart against that hidden copy via cli-autostart.js, and (c) spawns a detached, windowsHide, unref'd node process running dist/cli-agent.js. The agent opens a WebSocket to a C2 host whose address is not present as plaintext: dist/deploymentDefaults.js reconstructs a 32-byte AES-256-GCM key by XOR-ing two obfuscated Uint8Array halves (DEPLOYMENT_KEY_A^DEPLOYMENT_MASK_A, DEPLOYMENT_KEY_B^DEPLOYMENT_MASK_B) and decrypts DEPLOYMENT_CIPHER_TEXT_B64 (with IV/TAG) into publicHost / relayPort / apiPort / defaultExplorerPassword, from which ws://<host>:<port> is derived at runtime. Once connected, the agent runs dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js, which walks POSIX '/' or every Windows drive and matches files by name and content against rules in dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js: checksum-validated BIP-39 mnemonics, secp256k1 private keys, WIF, BIP32 xprv/tprv/zprv, Solana 64-byte keypair JSON, env-style KEY/SECRET/PRIVATE/SEED/MNEMONIC/PASSWORD lines, and JSON wallet fields. Matches (with full secret material by default) are packaged into agents/<hostname>/result.json and uploaded via @huggingface/hub uploadFiles to a Hugging Face repo, using an access token decrypted from CFGMGR_HF_CREDENTIALS_B64 / RELAY_HF_CREDENTIALS_B64 with the same XOR-derived bundle key. dist/shellHistoryScan.js separately enumerates ~/.bash_history, ~/.zsh_history, ~/.python_history, ~/.node_repl_history, ~/.mysql_history, ~/.psql_history, ~/.sqlite_history, ~/.lesshst, fish history, Windows PowerShell PSReadLine ConsoleHost_history.txt, Clink history, and Cygwin/msys homes, streaming records through syncClient to the same C2 relay. dist/hostInventorySend.js unconditionally POSTs hostname + os.type/platform/release/version + Node version to the same relay. dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js + dist/extensionDbHfUpload.js target Chromium/Chrome/Edge extension LevelDB stores (browser wallets, session cookies) and are enabled by default via FORGE_JS_AGENT_EXTENSION_DB_HF_UPLOAD='1' set in postinstall-agent.mjs's turnkeySpawnEnvOverrides. dist/index.js additionally re-exports relayAgent, windowsInputSync, clipboardEventWatcher, discordRelayUpload, and workerBootstrap, giving the C2 operator keyboard/clipboard capture, screenshot exfiltration (handleDiscordScreenshotUploadFromAgent), and arbitrary file upload. The near-duplicate bin entries (forge-jsx-explorer-*, forge-jsy-explorer-*, logger-daemon-regex-explorer-kill-agent) and CFGMGR_* / FORGE_JS_* env-var namespaces reinforce the Autodesk Forge / cfgmgr impersonation cover story.

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-07-05 00:00 UTC
Modified
2026-09-11 04:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

logger-daemon-regex

npm · All systems

Affected

  • Versions: 1.0.124

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: OpenSSF Malicious Packages · Apache-2.0

Sources & licences