jupyterlab-git
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.51.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.51.1
Fix
- Fixed version
0.51.1pip install --upgrade jupyterlab-git==0.51.1
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-30370, GHSA-cj5w-8mjf-r5f8
jupyterlab-git has a command injection vulnerability in "Open Git Repository in Terminal"
Overview
On many platforms, a third party can create a Git repository under a name that includes a shell command substitution [^1] string in the syntax $(<command>). These directory names are allowed in macOS and a majority of Linux distributions [^2]. If a user starts jupyter-lab in a parent directory of this inappropriately-named Git repository, opens it, and clicks "Git > Open Git Repository in Terminal" from the menu bar, then the injected command <command> is run in the user's shell without the user's permission.
This issue is occurring because when that menu entry is clicked, jupyterlab-git opens the terminal and runs cd <git-repo-path> through the shell to set the current directory [^3]. Doing so runs any command substitution strings present in the directory name, which leads to the command injection issue described here. A previous patch provided an incomplete fix [^4].
[^1]: https://www.gnu.org/software/bash/manual/html_node/Command-Substitution.html
[^2]: https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/File-Name-Portability.html
[^3]: https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab-git/blob/7eb3b06f0092223bd5494688ec264527bbeb2195/src/commandsAndMenu.tsx#L175-L184
[^4]: https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab-git/pull/1196
Scope of Impact
This issue allows for arbitrary code execution via command injection. A wide range of actions are permitted by this issue, including but not limited to: modifying files, exfiltrating data, halting services, or compromising the server's security rules.
We have scanned the source code of jupyterlab-git for other command injection risks, and have not found any at the time of writing.
This issue was reproduced on the latest release of jupyterlab-git, v0.51.0. The steps taken to reproduce this issue are described in the "Proof-of-concept" section below.
Proof-of-concept
mkdir test/ && cd test/.test/ with a command substitution string in the directory name by running these commands:mkdir '$(touch pwned.txt)'
cd '$(touch pwned.txt)/'
git init
cd ..
test/ by running jupyter lab.$(touch pwned.txt) in the file browser.pwned.txt is created under test/. This demonstrates the command injection issue described here.Proof-of-concept mitigation
The issue can be mitigated by the patch shown below.
<details><summary>Patch (click to expand)</summary>
diff --git a/src/commandsAndMenu.tsx b/src/commandsAndMenu.tsx
index 3779a6c..71ddcea 100644
--- a/src/commandsAndMenu.tsx
+++ b/src/commandsAndMenu.tsx
@@ -164,31 +164,13 @@ export function addCommands(
label: trans.__('Open Git Repository in Terminal'),
caption: trans.__('Open a New Terminal to the Git Repository'),
execute: async args => {
- const main = (await commands.execute(
- 'terminal:create-new',
- args
- )) as MainAreaWidget<ITerminal.ITerminal>;
+ const cwd = gitModel.pathRepository;
+ const main = (await commands.execute('terminal:create-new', {
+ ...args,
+ cwd
+ })) as MainAreaWidget<ITerminal.ITerminal>;
- try {
- if (gitModel.pathRepository !== null) {
- const terminal = main.content;
- terminal.session.send({
- type: 'stdin',
- content: [
- `cd "${gitModel.pathRepository
- .split('"')
- .join('\\"')
- .split('`')
- .join('\\`')}"\n`
- ]
- });
- }
-
- return main;
- } catch (e) {
- console.error(e);
- main.dispose();
- }
+ return main;
</details>
This patch removes the cd <git-repo-path> shell command that causes the issue. To preserve the existing behavior, the cwd argument is set to <git-repo-path> when a terminal session is created via the terminal:create-new JupyterLab command. This preserves the existing application behavior while mitigating the command injection issue.
We have verified that this patch works when applied to a local installation of jupyterlab-git. We have also verified that the cwd argument is available in all versions of JupyterLab 4, so this patch should be fully backwards-compatible.
Workarounds
We recommend that users upgrade to the patched versions listed on this GHSA. However, if a user is unable to upgrade, there are 3 different ways to mitigate this vulnerability without upgrading to a patch.
jupyter-server level: c.ServerApp.terminals_enabled = Falsejupyter server extension disable jupyter_server_terminalsjupyter labextension disable @jupyterlab/terminal-extensionHigh Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.4, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H
0, fixed 0.51.1 (ecosystem)0.51.1
0.51.1pip install --upgrade jupyterlab-git==0.51.1Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0