Advisory

PYSEC-2026-1486

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

print(f" • PATH_MAX symlink resolution bug bypassed security checks")
print(f" • File created outside intended cache directory")
print(f" • Same vulnerability pattern as TensorFlow get_file()")

print(f"\nšŸ“Š COMPARISON RESULTS:")
print(f" āœ… Python with filter='data': BLOCKED exploit")
print(f" āš ļø Keras get_file(): ALLOWED exploit")

else:
print(f"āœ… No exploit files detected")
print(f"Possible reasons:")
print(f" • Keras version includes security patches")
print(f" • Platform-specific path handling prevented exploit")
print(f" • Archive extraction path differed from expected")

Show what Keras actually extracted (safely)
print(f"\n=== KERAS EXTRACTION ANALYSIS ===")
try:
if 'extracted_path' in locals() and pathlib.Path(extracted_path).exists():
keras_path = pathlib.Path(extracted_path)
print(f"Keras extracted to: {keras_path}")

# Safely list contents
try:
contents = [item.name for item in keras_path.iterdir()]
print(f"Top-level contents: {contents}")

# Count symlinks (indicates our exploit structure was created)
symlink_count = 0
for item in keras_path.iterdir():
try:
if item.is_symlink():
symlink_count += 1
except PermissionError:
continue

print(f"Symlinks created: {symlink_count}")
if symlink_count > 0:
print(f"āœ“ PATH_MAX symlink chain was extracted")

except PermissionError:
print(f"Permission errors in extraction directory (expected with symlink corruption)")

except Exception as e:
print(f"Could not analyze Keras extraction: {e}")

print(f"\n=== REMEDIATION ===")
print(f"To fix this vulnerability, Keras should use:")
print(f"```python")
print(f"tarfile.extractall(path, filter='data') # Safe")
print(f"```")
print(f"Instead of:")
print(f"```python")
print(f"tarfile.extractall(path) # Vulnerable")
print(f"```")

Cleanup
print(f"\n=== CLEANUP ===")
try:
os.unlink("keras_dataset.tgz")
print(f"āœ“ Removed malicious tar file")
except:
pass

print("PoC completed!")

### Environment Setup
- **Python**: 3.8+ (tested on multiple versions)
- **Keras**: Standalone Keras or TensorFlow.Keras
- **Platform**: Linux, macOS, Windows (path handling varies)

### Exploitation Steps

1. **Create malicious tar archive** with PATH_MAX symlink chain
2. **Host archive** on accessible HTTP server
3. **Call `keras.utils.get_file()`** with `extract=True`
4. **Observe directory traversal** - files written outside cache directory

### Key Exploit Components

- **Deep symlink chain**: 16+ nested symlinks with long directory names
- **PATH_MAX overflow**: Final symlink path exceeding system limits
- **Traversal payload**: Relative path traversal (`../../../target/file`)
- **Legitimate disguise**: Archive contains valid-looking dataset files

### Demonstration Results

**Vulnerable behavior:**
- Files extracted outside intended `cache_dir/datasets/` location
- Security filtering bypassed completely
- No error or warning messages generated

**Expected secure behavior:**
- Extraction blocked or confined to cache directory
- Security warnings for suspicious archive contents

## Impact

### Vulnerability Classification
- **Type**: Directory Traversal / Path Traversal (CWE-22)
- **Severity**: High
- **CVSS Components**: Network accessible, no authentication required, impacts confidentiality and integrity

### Who Is Impacted

**Direct Impact:**
- Applications using `keras.utils.get_file()` with `extract=True`
- Machine learning pipelines downloading and extracting datasets
- Automated ML training systems processing external archives

**Attack Scenarios:**
1. **Malicious datasets**: Attacker hosts compromised ML dataset
2. **Supply chain**: Legitimate dataset repositories compromised
3. **Model poisoning**: Extraction writes malicious files alongside training data
4. **System compromise**: Configuration files, executables written to system directories

**Affected Environments:**
- Research environments downloading public datasets
- Production ML systems with automated dataset fetching
- Educational platforms using Keras for tutorials
- CI/CD pipelines training models with external data

### Risk Assessment

**High Risk Factors:**
- Common usage pattern in ML workflows
- No user awareness of extraction security
- Silent failure mode (no warnings)
- Cross-platform vulnerability

**Potential Consequences:**
- Arbitrary file write on target system
- Configuration file tampering
- Code injection via overwritten scripts
- Data exfiltration through planted files
- System compromise in containerized environments

## Recommended Fix

### Immediate Mitigation

Replace the vulnerable extraction code with:

```python
# Secure implementation
if zipfile.is_zipfile(file_path):
    # Zip archive - implement similar filtering
    archive.extractall(path, members=filter_safe_paths(archive))
else:
    # Tar archive with proper security filter
    archive.extractall(path, members=filter_safe_paths(archive), filter="data")

Long-term Solution

  1. Add `filter="data"` parameter to all tarfile.extractall() calls
  2. Implement comprehensive path validation before extraction
  3. Add extraction logging for security monitoring
  4. Consider sandboxed extraction for untrusted archives
  5. Update documentation to warn about archive security risks

Backward Compatibility

The fix maintains full backward compatibility as filter="data" is the recommended secure default for Python 3.12+.

References

Note: Reported in Huntr as well, but didn't get response
https://huntr.com/bounties/f94f5beb-54d8-4e6a-8bac-86d9aee103f4

Sources & licences