Advisory

PYSEC-2026-1927

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Suppose a user loads the model with the following code:

from skops.io import load, get_untrusted_types

unknown_types = get_untrusted_types(file="model.skops")
print("Unknown types", unknown_types)
input("Press enter to load the model...")
loaded = load("model.skops", trusted=unknown_types)

The output will be:

Unknown types ['sklearn.linear_model._stochastic_gradient.SGDRegressor.call', 'skops.io.loads']
Press enter to load the model...

This shows that the user is tricked into believing the model is safe, with apparently legitimate types like sklearn.linear_model._stochastic_gradient.SGDRegressor.call and skops.io.loads, while in reality, a shell is executed.

This is just one example, but the same technique can be used to execute any arbitrary code with even more misleading names.

Possible Fix

get_untrusted_types and load should verify what is actually called during the construction of the OperatorFuncNode, not just rely on the concatenation of the __module__ and __class__ keys, which do not reflect the true behavior in this case.

Impact
An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by crafting a malicious model file that, when loaded, requests trusted types that are different from those actually executed by the model. Potentially, this can escalate— as shown— to the execution of arbitrary code on the victim’s machine, requiring only the confirmation of a few seemingly safe types. The attack occurs at load time. This is particularly concerning given that skops is often used in collaborative environments and promotes a security-oriented policy.

Attachments
The complete PoC is available on GitHub at io-no/CVE-2025-54412.

Sources & licences