taguette
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.5.2(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.5.2
Fix
- Fixed version
1.5.2pip install --upgrade taguette==1.5.2
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-67502, GHSA-5923-r76v-mprm
Open Redirect Vulnerability in Taguette
Summary
An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in Taguette that allows attackers to craft malicious URLs that redirect users to arbitrary external websites after authentication. This can be exploited for phishing attacks where victims believe they are interacting with a trusted Taguette instance but are redirected to a malicious site designed to steal credentials or deliver malware.
Severity: Medium to High
---
Details
The application accepts a user-controlled next parameter and uses it directly in HTTP redirects without any validation. The vulnerable code is located in two places:
Location 1: Login Handler (taguette/web/views.py, lines 140-144)
def _go_to_next(self):
next_ = self.get_argument('next', '')
if not next_:
next_ = self.reverse_url('index')
return self.redirect(next_) # ← No validation of next_ parameter
This method is called after successful login (line 132) and when an already-logged-in user visits the login page (line 109).
Location 2: Cookies Prompt Handler (taguette/web/views.py, lines 79-85)
def post(self):
self.set_cookie('cookies_accepted', 'yes', dont_check=True)
next_ = self.get_argument('next', '')
if not next_:
next_ = self.reverse_url('index')
return self.redirect(next_) # ← No validation of next_ parameter
In both cases, if next_ is provided by the user, it is passed directly to self.redirect() without checking whether it points to the same host or is a relative URL.
---

PoC
Simply replace [your-taguette-instance] with your Taguette server domain and test these URLs in your browser:
Test 1: Cookies Prompt Redirect
https://[your-taguette-instance]/cookies?next=https://google.com
https://google.com (external site)Test 2: Login Redirect
https://[your-taguette-instance]/login?next=https://google.com
https://google.com (external site)Test 3: Already Logged In Redirect
https://[your-taguette-instance]/login?next=https://google.com
https://google.com> Note: We use google.com as a safe external site for testing. In a real attack, this would be a phishing site.
---
Impact
next parameterThe vulnerability is particularly dangerous because:
---
Recommended Fix
Validate that the next parameter is either a relative URL or points to the same host before redirecting.
Example Fix
Add a validation function:
from urllib.parse import urlparse
def is_safe_url(url, host):
"""Check if URL is safe for redirect (relative or same host)."""
if not url:
return False
parsed = urlparse(url)
# Reject protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com)
if url.startswith('//'):
return False
# Allow relative URLs (no scheme and no netloc)
if not parsed.scheme and not parsed.netloc:
return True
# Allow same-host URLs
return parsed.netloc == host
Then update the vulnerable methods:
def _go_to_next(self):
next_ = self.get_argument('next', '')
if not next_ or not is_safe_url(next_, self.request.host):
next_ = self.reverse_url('index')
return self.redirect(next_)
Apply the same fix to the CookiesPrompt.post() method.
---
Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 5.4, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
0, fixed 1.5.2 (ecosystem)1.5.2
1.5.2pip install --upgrade taguette==1.5.2Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0