vllm
Affected
- introduced
0.5.0, fixed0.11.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.11.0
Fix
- Fixed version
0.11.0pip install --upgrade vllm==0.11.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-6242, GHSA-3f6c-7fw2-ppm4
vLLM is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) through MediaConnector class
Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the MediaConnector class within the vLLM project's multimodal feature set. The load_from_url and load_from_url_async methods fetch and process media from user-provided URLs without adequate restrictions on the target hosts. This allows an attacker to coerce the vLLM server into making arbitrary requests to internal network resources.
This vulnerability is particularly critical in containerized environments like llm-d, where a compromised vLLM pod could be used to scan the internal network, interact with other pods, and potentially cause denial of service or access sensitive data. For example, an attacker could make the vLLM pod send malicious requests to an internal llm-d management endpoint, leading to system instability by falsely reporting metrics like the KV cache state.
Vulnerability Details
The core of the vulnerability lies in the MediaConnector.load_from_url method and its asynchronous counterpart. These methods accept a URL string to fetch media content (images, audio, video).
https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/119f683949dfed10df769fe63b2676d7f1eb644e/vllm/multimodal/utils.py#L97-L113
The function directly processes URLs with http, https, and file schemes. An attacker can supply a URL pointing to an internal IP address or a localhost endpoint. The vLLM server will then initiate a connection to this internal resource.
{"image_url": "http://127.0.0.1:8080/internal_api"}. The vLLM server will send a GET request to this internal endpoint._load_file_url method attempts to restrict file access to a subdirectory defined by --allowed-local-media-path. While this is a good security measure for local file access, it does not prevent network-based SSRF attacks.Impact in llm-d Environments
The risk is significantly amplified in orchestrated environments such as llm-d, where multiple pods communicate over an internal network.
llm-d cluster. For instance, if a monitoring or metrics service is exposed internally, an attacker could send malformed requests to it. A specific example is an attacker causing the vLLM pod to call an internal API that reports a false KV cache utilization, potentially triggering incorrect scaling decisions or even a system shutdown.http://10.0.0.X:PORT and observing the server's response time or error messages.Delegating this security responsibility to an upper-level orchestrator like llm-d is problematic. The orchestrator cannot easily distinguish between legitimate requests initiated by the vLLM engine for its own purposes and malicious requests originating from user input, thus complicating traffic filtering rules and increasing management overhead.
Fix
See the --allowed-media-domains option discussed here: https://docs.vllm.ai/en/latest/usage/security.html#4-restrict-domains-access-for-media-urls
High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.1, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H
0.5.0, fixed 0.11.0 (ecosystem)0.11.0
0.11.0pip install --upgrade vllm==0.11.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0