yt-dlp
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2024.07.01(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2024.07.01
Fix
- Fixed version
2024.07.01pip install --upgrade yt-dlp==2024.07.01
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2024-38519, GHSA-79w7-vh3h-8g4j
yt-dlp File system modification and RCE through improper file-extension sanitization
Summaryyt-dlp does not limit the extensions of downloaded files, which could lead to arbitrary filenames being created in the download folder (and path traversal on Windows). Since yt-dlp also reads config from the working directory (and on Windows executables will be executed from the yt-dlp directory) this could lead to arbitrary code being executed.
Patchesyt-dlp version 2024.07.01 fixes this issue by whitelisting the allowed extensions.
This means some very uncommon extensions might not get downloaded; however, it will also limit the possible exploitation surface.
Workarounds
It is recommended to upgrade yt-dlp to version 2024.07.01 as soon as possible, always have .%(ext)s at the end of the output template, and make sure you trust the websites that you are downloading from. Also, make sure to never download to a directory within PATH or other sensitive locations like your user directory, system32, or other binaries locations.
For users not able to upgrade:
--ies default,-generic)-o "%(title)s [%(id)s].%(ext)s)--write-subs, --write-auto-subs, --all-subs, --write-srt)--ignore-config --config-location ... to not load config from common locationsDetails
One potential exploitation might look like this:
From a mimetype we do not know, we default to trimming the leading bit and using the remainder. Given a webpage that contains
<script type="application/ld+json">
{
"@context": "https://schema.org",
"@type": "VideoObject",
"name": "ffmpeg",
"encodingFormat": "video/exe",
"contentUrl": "https://example.com/video.mp4"
}
</script>
this will try and download a file called ffmpeg.exe (-o "%(title)s.%(ext)s).ffmpeg.exe will be searched for in the current directory, and so upon the next run arbitrary code can be executed.
Alternatively, when engineering a file called yt-dlp.conf to be created, the config file could contain --exec ... and so would also execute arbitrary code.
Acknowledgement
A big thanks to @JarLob for independently finding a new application of the same underlying issue.
More can be read about on the dedicated GitHub Security Lab disclosure here: [Path traversal saving subtitles (GHSL-2024-090)](https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-090_yt-dlp)
References
High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
0, fixed 2024.07.01 (ecosystem)2024.07.01
2024.07.01pip install --upgrade yt-dlp==2024.07.01Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0