Advisory

PYSEC-2026-2378

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

I also verified overwrite, not just creation, by pre-creating a writable target file and then running the same install path. The existing file contents changed from ORIGINAL-MAIN to OVERWRITTEN-MAIN before rejection.

I further verified overwrite of a pre-existing project workflow file. Before the run, the target file contained:

name: safe
on: [push]
jobs:
  build:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - run: echo safe

After the run, the same file contained attacker-controlled replacement YAML:

name: overwritten
on: [push]
jobs:
  build:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - run: echo overwritten-by-archive

Observed command output on latest main:

[!] Install interrupted after 0.0s.
Usage: python -m apm_cli.cli install [OPTIONS] [PACKAGES]...
Try 'python -m apm_cli.cli install --help' for help.

Error: 'D:\apm\run-main-install\input\legacy-bundle.tar.gz' was packed with '--format apm' (legacy format). 'apm install <bundle>' requires the plugin format. Repack with 'apm pack --format plugin --archive', or use 'apm unpack' to deploy the legacy bundle.

Reproduction steps for latest release v0.12.4:

  1. Check out tag v0.12.4 / commit 6aceef72be490a9c716547f600a2659f3f2826b7.
  2. Use the same Windows Python 3.11 runtime.
  3. Ensure the apm_cli import resolves to the v0.12.4 tree.
  4. Create the same malicious tarball shape, for example with:
D:/apm/run-release-install/outside/legacy-probe-outside-release.txt
  1. Run:
python -m apm_cli.cli install D:\apm\run-release-install\input\legacy-bundle.tar.gz

Observed result on latest release:

  • the import path resolved to the checked-out v0.12.4 tree,
  • the command ended with the expected legacy-format rejection,
  • the process exit code was 2,
  • and the file below had already been created outside the temporary extraction root:
D:\apm\run-release-install\outside\legacy-probe-outside-release.txt

The file contained:

outside write via install release

I also verified overwrite, not just creation, on the latest release by pre-creating a writable target file. The existing file contents changed from ORIGINAL-RELEASE to OVERWRITTEN-RELEASE before rejection. The same workflow-file overwrite pattern was also reproducible on the latest release.

Observed command output on latest release:

[!] Install interrupted after 0.0s.
Usage: python -m apm_cli.cli install [OPTIONS] [PACKAGES]...
Try 'python -m apm_cli.cli install --help' for help.

Error: 'D:\apm\run-release-install\input\legacy-bundle.tar.gz' was packed with '--format apm' (legacy format). 'apm install <bundle>' requires the plugin format. Repack with 'apm pack --format plugin --archive', or use 'apm unpack' to deploy the legacy bundle.

Additional same-family affected surface:

  • apm unpack on latest main and latest release also created an outside file when given a tarball containing a Windows absolute member name.
  • In that path the command completed successfully with exit code 0, which further confirms that the Windows absolute-path validation gap is present outside the primary install probe as well.

Impact

This is an arbitrary local file overwrite outside the intended extraction root during a current APM install path. The impacted population is Windows users running APM on supported Python 3.10 or 3.11 runtimes. The attacker capability required is the ability to supply a crafted local bundle and induce the victim to run apm install on it.

The strongest demonstrated real-world consequence is attacker-controlled overwrite of an existing writable file at an attacker-selected Windows path outside the extraction root, using the privileges of the user running APM. An overwrite of a project-controlled GitHub Actions workflow file with attacker-controlled YAML before rejection was verified. Workflow execution from this report hasn't been claimed; the demonstrated consequence is high-integrity modification of a trusted automation file outside the intended extraction boundary.

The issue is currently reachable on:

  • latest main at 2b7a931d58a73cbfc0bcf086cea332d204075e27
  • latest release v0.12.4

Mitigation

  1. Reuse the existing pre-extraction validation already implemented in detect_local_bundle() for _looks_like_legacy_apm_bundle().
  2. Reject Windows absolute member names before any extraction step.
  3. Apply equivalent Windows absolute-path validation to the unpacker in src/apm_cli/bundle/unpacker.py.
  4. Add regression tests for:
  • Windows absolute member paths in the legacy-bundle probe path
  • Windows absolute member paths in the unpack path
  • confirmation that no host write occurs before the legacy-format rejection is raised

Attachment
apm-legacy-probe-windows-absolute-path-write-20260511.zip

Sources & licences