apm-cli
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.8.12(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.8.12
Fix
- Fixed version
0.8.12pip install --upgrade apm-cli==0.8.12
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-44641, GHSA-xhrw-5qxx-jpwr
Microsoft APM CLI's plugin.json component paths escape plugin root and copy arbitrary host files during install
Summary
Microsoft APM normalizes marketplace plugins by copying plugin components referenced in plugin.json into .apm/. The manifest fields agents, skills, commands, and hooks are attacker-controlled, but the implementation does not enforce that those paths remain inside the plugin directory. A malicious plugin can therefore use absolute paths or ../ traversal paths to copy arbitrary readable host files or directories from the installer's machine during apm install.
In the verified primary proof of concept, a malicious plugin sets plugin.json.commands to an external markdown file. A single apm install copies that outside file into .apm/prompts/ and then auto-integrates it into .github/prompts/secret.prompt.md in the victim project. This is a local supply-chain trust-boundary violation with direct confidentiality and integrity impact.
Reviewed version and commit:
apm-cli version 0.8.11main commit 70b34faa16a5a783424698163deeb028854fd23aDetails
Root cause:
src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:336-348_resolve_sources() joins manifest-controlled agents, skills, commands, and directory-form hooks paths with plugin_pathexists() and is_symlink()src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:356-395.apm/src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:397-452.apm/src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:436-442There is already a safer precedent in the same module:
src/apm_cli/deps/plugin_parser.py:195-210_read_mcp_file() resolves the candidate pathReachability:
src/apm_cli/commands/install.py:2007-2015normalize_plugin_directory(...)src/apm_cli/deps/github_downloader.py:2224-2230validate_apm_package(target_path)src/apm_cli/models/validation.py:164-172, 224-226, 304-324Project write-back path:
src/apm_cli/integration/prompt_integrator.py:38-56.apm/prompts/*.prompt.mdsrc/apm_cli/integration/prompt_integrator.py:170-189.github/prompts/src/apm_cli/commands/install.py:2496-2514This means a malicious dependency can cause APM to read from outside the dependency itself and materialize host-local content into managed install output and, in the verified prompt case, directly into the victim project.
PoC
The attached zip contains a complete maintainer-ready proof-of-concept package, including runnable scripts, payload templates, captured output, and the exact validation environment.
Primary end-to-end apm install reproduction:
apm-cli 0.8.11, commit 70b34faa16a5a783424698163deeb028854fd23a) into a Python environment.victim\secret.md
with content:
# STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL
plugin.json:{
"name": "evil-plugin",
"commands": "D:\\absolute\\path\\to\\victim\\secret.md"
}
apm.yml that references the malicious plugin.apm install
.github/prompts/secret.prompt.md
# STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL
Verified console output from the included PoC:
[>] Installing dependencies from apm.yml...
[+] ./evil-plugin (local)
|-- 1 prompts integrated -> .github/prompts/
[*] Installed 1 APM dependency.
PoC succeeded.
Integrated into project: ...\.github\prompts\secret.prompt.md
Integrated content:
# STOLEN VIA APM INSTALL
Secondary remote-parity reproduction:
reproduce-remote-parity.py exercises GitHubPackageDownloader.download_package(...) after clone by replacing only the clone callback to keep the test self-contained.<download-target>/.apm/prompts/secret.prompt.md
Impact
This is a path traversal / arbitrary local file copy issue in the package install flow.
Who is impacted:
apm install against a malicious or compromised plugin dependencyWhat an attacker gains:
.apm/ during install.apm/.apm/prompts/Practical impact:
.github/prompts/, increasing the chance that sensitive or attacker-selected content is committed, synced, or consumed by other toolingMitigation
Recommended fix:
plugin_path.resolve().agents, skills, commands, and both hooks code paths.commandscommands../ traversal in agents../ traversal in skills../ traversal in hooksHigh Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.1, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
0, fixed 0.8.12 (ecosystem)0.8.12
0.8.12pip install --upgrade apm-cli==0.8.12Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0