flaskbb
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected2.2.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-46556, GHSA-xq32-9g7q-7297
FlaskBB: SSRF in get_image_info() via unrestricted avatar URL
###Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in get_image_info() allows any authenticated user to force the server to send HTTP requests to arbitrary internal endpoints, including cloud metadata services (e.g., AWS 169.254.169.254). This is a blind SSRF with confirmed internal port scanning and internal API triggering capabilities. CVSS 6.5 Medium.
###Details
In flaskbb/utils/helpers.py (line 571), the url parameter is passed directly to requests.get(url, stream=True) without any validation of scheme, host, or IP address.
python# flaskbb/utils/helpers.py:571
def get_image_info(url: str):
r = requests.get(url, timeout=(3.05, 27), stream=True)
Attack chain:
POST /user/settings/user-details (avatar URL)
→ ValidateAvatarURL.validate() # validators.py:103
→ check_image(avatar) # helpers.py:628
→ get_image_info(url) # helpers.py:571
→ requests.get(url) # No domain/IP restriction
Entry points:
/user/settings/user-details (any authenticated user)
/admin/users/<id>/edit (admin only)
###PoC
submit.zip
Log in to FlaskBB as any user
Navigate to Settings → User Details
Enter http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ as the avatar URL
Submit the form
The server sends a GET request to the internal metadata endpoint
Three exploitation channels confirmed:
Server-side request: Captured on mock metadata server
Internal port scan: check_image() returns distinct errors (CONN_REFUSED, NO_CONTENT_LENGTH, TYPE_NOT_ALLOWED, SUCCESS) that map internal network topology
Internal API triggering: Mock APIs on 127.0.0.1:9200 triggered via SSRF (deploy, shutdown, key dump endpoints)
###Impact
Any authenticated user is impacted. Attackers can force the server to request internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or private network resources. On cloud deployments (AWS/GCP/Azure), IAM credentials can be leaked. In production, any GET-triggered internal service is reachable: CI/CD webhooks, Elasticsearch, etcd, Consul, etc.
Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 6.5, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
0, last affected 2.2.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0