Advisory

PYSEC-2026-2528

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

End-to-end reproduction (against pip install joserfc==1.6.7)

# 1. Boot the WSGI server. JWT_SECRET unset to model the misconfigured-secret
#    state.
python3.12 -m venv venv
./venv/bin/pip install joserfc==1.6.7
./venv/bin/python server.py &   # listens on :8383

# 2. Run the attacker
./venv/bin/python attacker.py

Captured run output (canonical pre-fix run, joserfc 1.6.7,
poc-attacker-empty-20260523-150949.log):

forged token: eyJhbGciOiAiSFMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogIkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiAiYXR0YWNrZXIiLCAiYWRtaW4iOiB0cnVlLCAiaWF0IjogMTc3OTUyMDU4OSwgImV4cCI6IDE3Nzk1MjExODl9.yE8nFmSVmQJ2Slft-BlxD04ypabkV128XbPcU6SRnBY
HTTP 200
OK: sub='attacker' admin=True

Control (real 256-bit secret, poc-control-realkey-20260523-150959.log):

forged token: eyJhbGciOiAiSFMyNTYi...
HTTP 401
DENY: BadSignatureError: bad_signature:

Interpretation:

| Configuration | Observed | Expected |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------|
| JWT_SECRET unset (== "") | HTTP 200, admin=True (verified) | HTTP 401 |
| JWT_SECRET = 256-bit value | HTTP 401, BadSignatureError | HTTP 401 |

The first row demonstrates that an attacker with zero knowledge of the
verification secret reaches the protected path by signing with the empty
key. The second row confirms the verifier behaves correctly when the
secret is non-empty, proving the bug is gated only on the secret being
empty rather than on any structural defect in the attacker's token.

Fix verification: with the suggested empty-key reject wired into
HMACAlgorithm.sign / .verify, the empty-secret server re-run rejects
the same forged token with ValueError: HMAC key must not be empty.

Impact

  • Complete authentication bypass on any service whose key finder resolves to "" / None (env var unset, DB row missing, fallback). Attacker forges arbitrary claims (sub, admin, scopes, audience, expiry).
  • The misconfiguration that triggers the bug is silent: the server does not fail to boot, joserfc emits a single SecurityWarning ("Key size should be >= 112 bits") at OctKey.import_key time and then proceeds.
  • Severity matches the parent (ruby-jwt CVE-2026-45363, CVSS 7.4 high). CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N — AC:H because of the operator-misconfiguration precondition; impact otherwise matches authentication bypass.

Suggested fix

Upgrade the existing < 14 bytes warning in OctKey.import_key to a hard
reject at len(key.raw_value) == 0, plus a defence-in-depth check in
HMACAlgorithm.sign and HMACAlgorithm.verify after
key.get_op_key(...):

# src/joserfc/_rfc7518/oct_key.py
@classmethod
def import_key(cls, value, parameters=None, password=None) -> "OctKey":
    key: OctKey = super(OctKey, cls).import_key(value, parameters, password)
    if not key.raw_value:
        raise ValueError("oct key material must not be empty")
    if len(key.raw_value) < 14:
        warnings.warn("Key size should be >= 112 bits", SecurityWarning)
    return key

# src/joserfc/_rfc7518/jws_algs.py
class HMACAlgorithm(JWSAlgModel):
    ...
    def sign(self, msg: bytes, key: OctKey) -> bytes:
        op_key = key.get_op_key("sign")
        if not op_key:
            raise ValueError("HMAC key must not be empty")
        return hmac.new(op_key, msg, self.hash_alg).digest()

    def verify(self, msg: bytes, sig: bytes, key: OctKey) -> bool:
        op_key = key.get_op_key("verify")
        if not op_key:
            raise ValueError("HMAC key must not be empty")
        v_sig = hmac.new(op_key, msg, self.hash_alg).digest()
        return hmac.compare_digest(sig, v_sig)

The two-layer fix mirrors PyJWT 2.13.0's approach (reject empty in
prepare_key, plus the runtime length checks the underlying hmac
primitive does not perform).

Fix PR

authlib/joserfc-ghsa-gg9x-qcx2-xmrh#1 (temp private fork PR), branch
fix/hmac-reject-empty-key, base main. URL:
https://github.com/authlib/joserfc-ghsa-gg9x-qcx2-xmrh/pull/1

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot.

Sources & licences