Advisory

PYSEC-2026-2735

Also known as: CVE-2026-44550, GHSA-hr43-rjmr-7wmm

Summary

Open WebUI's Mass Assignment via Pydantic extra='allow' Allows Creating Folders in Other Users' Accounts

Details

Mass Assignment via Pydantic extra='allow' Allows Creating Folders in Other Users' Accounts

Affected Component

Folder creation endpoint and form model:

  • backend/open_webui/models/folders.py (lines 72-77, FolderForm with extra='allow')
  • backend/open_webui/models/folders.py (lines 95-106, insert_new_folder dict construction)
  • backend/open_webui/routers/folders.py (line 119, create_folder endpoint)

Affected Versions

Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions since FolderForm adopted extra='allow'.

Description

FolderForm uses model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow'), which permits arbitrary fields to pass through Pydantic validation and be included in model_dump(exclude_unset=True). In insert_new_folder, the server-assigned user_id is placed at the start of the dict and then overwritten by the spread of form data:

# models/folders.py:95-106
folder = FolderModel(
    **{
        'id': id,                                              # server
        'user_id': user_id,                                    # server — overwritten below
        **(form_data.model_dump(exclude_unset=True) or {}),    # user-controlled (extra='allow')
        'parent_id': parent_id,
        'created_at': int(time.time()),
        'updated_at': int(time.time()),
    }
)

Because FolderModel declares user_id: str as a real field (not just a form extra), any attacker-supplied user_id in the POST body is accepted by the model and persisted on the Folder row.

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker discovers a victim's user ID. User UUIDs commonly leak via the user search endpoint (GET /api/v1/users/search, intentionally accessible to verified users for sharing UI), shared chat metadata, or channel member lists.
  2. Attacker sends:
   POST /api/v1/folders/
   {
     "name": "Important: Click here",
     "user_id": "<victim_user_id>",
     "meta": {"icon": "warning"},
     "data": {...}
   }
  1. Pydantic accepts the extra user_id field (allowed by extra='allow').
  2. insert_new_folder spreads the form data over the server-set 'user_id': user_id, overwriting it with the attacker's value.
  3. The Folder row is persisted with user_id = <victim_user_id>.
  4. The victim sees the attacker-planted folder in their UI on next load because GET /api/v1/folders/ filters by the viewer's own user_id.

The attacker can repeat this to plant multiple folders, use crafted name values for phishing ("Click here to recover account" / "Security alert"), and abuse the meta and data fields to add visual elements that further mimic legitimate content.

Impact

  • Unauthorized write into victim's folder tree
  • Phishing surface: attacker-controlled name, meta, and data render in the victim's UI in a trusted context
  • DoS / spam: attacker can flood a victim with arbitrary folders; victim must manually delete each one
  • Attacker cannot read the folder back — all read paths filter by the caller's own user_id — so confidentiality is preserved, but integrity and trust are compromised

Preconditions

  • Attacker must have an authenticated account with features.folders permission (default for all users)
  • Attacker must know or guess the victim's user UUID (obtainable through various non-sensitive endpoints)

Severity

Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 5, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N

Dates

Published
2026-07-13 15:15 UTC
Modified
2026-07-13 16:32 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

open-webui

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.9.0 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

0.9.0

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.9.0
    pip install --upgrade open-webui==0.9.0

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences