pydantic-ai
Affected
- introduced
0.0.26, fixed1.56.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.56.0
Fix
- Fixed version
1.56.0pip install --upgrade pydantic-ai==1.56.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-25580, GHSA-2jrp-274c-jhv3, PYSEC-2026-2980
Pydantic AI has Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in URL Download Handling
Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in Pydantic AI's URL download functionality. When applications accept message history from untrusted sources, attackers can include malicious URLs that cause the server to make HTTP requests to internal network resources, potentially accessing internal services or cloud credentials.
This vulnerability only affects applications that accept message history from external users, such as those using:
Applications that only use hardcoded or developer-controlled URLs are not affected.
Description
The download_item() helper function downloads content from URLs without validating that the target is a public internet address. When user-supplied message history contains URLs, attackers can:
http://127.0.0.1, localhost, or private IP ranges (10.x.x.x, 172.16.x.x, 192.168.x.x)169.254.169.254, GCP, Azure, Alibaba Cloud)Who Is Affected
You are affected if your application:
ImageUrl, AudioUrl, VideoUrl, DocumentUrl objects from user input.Attack Scenario
Via chat interface, an attacker submits a message with a file attachment pointing to an internal resource:
{
"role": "user",
"parts": [
{"type": "file", "mediaType": "image/png", "url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"}
]
}
Affected Model Integrations
Multiple model integrations download URL content in certain conditions:
| Provider | Downloaded Types |
|----------|------------------|
| OpenAIChatModel | AudioUrl, DocumentUrl |
| AnthropicModel | DocumentUrl (text/plain) |
| GoogleModel (GLA) | All URL types (except YouTube and Files API URLs) |
| XaiModel | DocumentUrl |
| BedrockConverseModel | ImageUrl, DocumentUrl, VideoUrl (non-S3 URLs) |
| OpenRouterModel | AudioUrl |
Remediation
Upgrade to Patched Version
Upgrade to the patched version or later. The fix adds comprehensive SSRF protection:
allow-local)http:// and https:// protocolsNew force_download='allow-local' Option
If an application legitimately needs to access local/private network resources (e.g., in a fully trusted internal environment), it can explicitly opt in:
from pydantic_ai import ImageUrl
# Default behavior: private IPs are blocked
ImageUrl(url="http://internal-service/image.png") # Raises ValueError
# Opt-in to allow local access (use with caution)
ImageUrl(url="http://internal-service/image.png", force_download='allow-local')
Important: Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, fd00:ec2::254, 100.100.100.200) are always blocked, even with allow-local.
Workaround for Older Versions
If a project cannot upgrade immediately, use a history processor to filter out URLs targeting local/private addresses:
import ipaddress
import socket
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from pydantic_ai import Agent, ModelMessage, ModelRequest
from pydantic_ai.messages import AudioUrl, DocumentUrl, ImageUrl, VideoUrl
def is_private_url(url: str) -> bool:
"""Check if a URL targets a private/internal IP address."""
try:
parsed = urlparse(url)
hostname = parsed.hostname
if not hostname:
return True # Invalid URL, block it
# Resolve hostname to IP
ip_str = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
# Block private, loopback, and link-local addresses
return ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local
except (socket.gaierror, ValueError):
return True # DNS resolution failed, block it
def filter_private_urls(messages: list[ModelMessage]) -> list[ModelMessage]:
"""Remove URL parts that target private/internal addresses."""
url_types = (ImageUrl, AudioUrl, VideoUrl, DocumentUrl)
filtered = []
for msg in messages:
if isinstance(msg, ModelRequest):
safe_parts = [
part for part in msg.parts
if not (isinstance(part, url_types) and is_private_url(part.url))
]
if safe_parts:
filtered.append(ModelRequest(parts=safe_parts))
else:
filtered.append(msg)
return filtered
# Apply the filter to your agent
agent = Agent('openai:gpt-5', history_processors=[filter_private_urls])
Technical Details of the Fix
The fix introduces a new _ssrf.py module with comprehensive protection:
http:// and https:// allowed127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128 (loopback)10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16 (private)169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10 (link-local)100.64.0.0/10 (CGNAT)fc00::/7 (unique local)2002::/16 (6to4, can embed private IPv4)169.254.169.254, fd00:ec2::254, 100.100.100.200High Basis: CVSS v3 score 8.6, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
0.0.26, fixed 1.56.0 (ecosystem)1.56.0
1.56.0pip install --upgrade pydantic-ai==1.56.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0