Advisory

PYSEC-2026-3030

Also known as: CVE-2026-33139, GHSA-v3xv-8vc3-h2m6

Summary

PySpector has a Plugin Sandbox Bypass leads to Arbitrary Code Execution

Details

Summary
PySpector versions <= 0.1.6 are affected by a security validation bypass in the plugin system. The validate_plugin_code() function in plugin_system.py, performs static AST analysis to block dangerous API calls before a plugin is trusted and executed. However, the internal resolve_name() helper only handles ast.Name and ast.Attribute node types, returning None for all others. When a plugin uses indirect function calls via getattr() (such as getattr(os, 'system')) the outer call's func node is of type ast.Call, causing resolve_name() to return None, and the security check to be silently skipped. The plugin incorrectly passes the trust workflow, and executes arbitrary system commands on the user's machine when loaded.

Impact
An attacker who can deliver a malicious plugin file to a PySpector user and convince them to install it, can achieve arbitrary code execution on the user's local machine. Exploitation requires the victim to explicitly run pyspector plugin install --trust on the malicious file (a deliberate multi-step action that meaningfully limits the attack surface compared to passive vulnerabilities). However, the bypass directly undermines the security guarantee that validate_plugin_code() is designed to provide. Once the plugin is trusted and executed, the following is achievable:

  • Full read/write access to the local filesystem
  • Exfiltration of sensitive data and environment variables (i.e. API keys, credentials, etc...)
  • Establishment of persistence mechanisms
  • Lateral movement in CI/CD environments where PySpector runs with elevated permissions (pre-commit hooks and scheduled scans)

Any user of PySpector who installs third-party plugins outside the official repository is potentially affected.

PoC
The following steps reproduce the vulnerability on PySpector <= 0.1.6:

  1. Create a malicious plugin file that uses getattr-based indirect calls to bypass AST validation, and confirm the validator incorrectly marks it as safe:

<img width="1300" height="675" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4de3a0d1-1c77-4454-ad10-2369d5ca9997" />

  1. Run PySpector Plugin Validator module (this confirms the validator incorrectly marks the plugin as safe):

<img width="908" height="239" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3e3b9603-4d95-4a39-be97-4163f6639599" />

  1. Install and trust the plugin through the normal PySpector workflow:

pyspector plugin install /tmp/evil_plugin.py --trust

  1. Execute the plugin, during a scan:

pyspector scan /any/target --plugin evil

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-07-13 14:36 UTC
Modified
2026-07-13 16:33 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

pyspector

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.1.7 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

0.1.7

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.1.7
    pip install --upgrade pyspector==0.1.7

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences