Advisory

PYSEC-2026-3396

Also known as: CVE-2026-44661, GHSA-39j6-4867-gg4w

Summary

utcp-http vulnerable to SSRF via attacker-controlled OpenAPI servers[0].url in HTTP communication protocol

Details

Summary

The utcp-http plugin is vulnerable to a blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) caused by a trust-boundary inconsistency between manual discovery and tool invocation. register_manual() validates the discovery URL against an HTTPS / loopback allowlist, but call_tool() and call_tool_streaming() reuse the resolved tool_call_template.url directly without revalidating. An attacker who hosts a malicious OpenAPI spec on a legitimate HTTPS endpoint can declare servers: [{ url: "http://169.254.169.254" }] (or any internal address) in the spec; the OpenAPI converter blindly trusts that value and the tool becomes a blind SSRF primitive that exposes cloud metadata, internal services, and other firewalled-only endpoints to the LLM caller.

All three HTTP-class protocols (utcp_http.http, utcp_http.streamable_http, utcp_http.sse) shared the same gap, plus a separate prefix-bypass: the previous startswith("http://localhost") check let URLs like http://localhost.evil.com through.

Impact

A remote attacker who can convince the agent (via the LLM context, prompt injection, or a tool-discovery surface) to register their HTTPS OpenAPI URL can:

  • Map internal networks behind the agent.
  • Read AWS/GCP IAM credentials from cloud metadata endpoints (http://169.254.169.254, http://metadata.google.internal).
  • Reach unauthenticated internal services (Elasticsearch, Redis HTTP, internal admin panels).
  • Have responses returned to the LLM, which combined with prompt injection enables exfiltration back to the attacker.

Affected versions

utcp-http <= 1.1.1.

Patched versions

utcp-http 1.1.2.

Patch

Commit: 5b16e43 on dev.

  • New utcp_http._security helper: ensure_secure_url(url, context=...) parses the URL with urllib.parse.urlparse and validates the hostname (not a string prefix) against the loopback set, closing the localhost.evil.com bypass.
  • All three protocols call ensure_secure_url(url, context="manual discovery") in register_manual (replacing the duplicated prefix check) and ensure_secure_url(url, context="tool invocation") immediately before each aiohttp request in call_tool / call_tool_streaming. The runtime check is the actual SSRF fix.
  • New regression tests in test_security.py pin the accept/reject decisions and explicitly cover the historical bypass cases.

Workarounds

For users who cannot upgrade immediately:

  • Refuse to call register_manual with any URL controlled by an untrusted party, even over HTTPS.
  • Restrict outbound network access from the host running the agent so internal addresses (RFC1918, 169.254.0.0/16, loopback for cloud metadata) are unreachable.

Credit

Discovered and reported by @YLChen-007 in #83.

Severity

Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 4.7, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

Dates

Published
2026-07-13 15:15 UTC
Modified
2026-07-13 16:33 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

utcp-http

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.1.2 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

1.1.2

Fix

  • Fixed version 1.1.2
    pip install --upgrade utcp-http==1.1.2

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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Source

Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences