utcp-http
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.1.2(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.1.2
Fix
- Fixed version
1.1.2pip install --upgrade utcp-http==1.1.2
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-44661, GHSA-39j6-4867-gg4w
utcp-http vulnerable to SSRF via attacker-controlled OpenAPI servers[0].url in HTTP communication protocol
Summary
The utcp-http plugin is vulnerable to a blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) caused by a trust-boundary inconsistency between manual discovery and tool invocation. register_manual() validates the discovery URL against an HTTPS / loopback allowlist, but call_tool() and call_tool_streaming() reuse the resolved tool_call_template.url directly without revalidating. An attacker who hosts a malicious OpenAPI spec on a legitimate HTTPS endpoint can declare servers: [{ url: "http://169.254.169.254" }] (or any internal address) in the spec; the OpenAPI converter blindly trusts that value and the tool becomes a blind SSRF primitive that exposes cloud metadata, internal services, and other firewalled-only endpoints to the LLM caller.
All three HTTP-class protocols (utcp_http.http, utcp_http.streamable_http, utcp_http.sse) shared the same gap, plus a separate prefix-bypass: the previous startswith("http://localhost") check let URLs like http://localhost.evil.com through.
Impact
A remote attacker who can convince the agent (via the LLM context, prompt injection, or a tool-discovery surface) to register their HTTPS OpenAPI URL can:
http://169.254.169.254, http://metadata.google.internal).Affected versions
utcp-http <= 1.1.1.
Patched versions
utcp-http 1.1.2.
Patch
Commit: 5b16e43 on dev.
utcp_http._security helper: ensure_secure_url(url, context=...) parses the URL with urllib.parse.urlparse and validates the hostname (not a string prefix) against the loopback set, closing the localhost.evil.com bypass.ensure_secure_url(url, context="manual discovery") in register_manual (replacing the duplicated prefix check) and ensure_secure_url(url, context="tool invocation") immediately before each aiohttp request in call_tool / call_tool_streaming. The runtime check is the actual SSRF fix.test_security.py pin the accept/reject decisions and explicitly cover the historical bypass cases.Workarounds
For users who cannot upgrade immediately:
register_manual with any URL controlled by an untrusted party, even over HTTPS.Credit
Discovered and reported by @YLChen-007 in #83.
Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 4.7, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
0, fixed 1.1.2 (ecosystem)1.1.2
1.1.2pip install --upgrade utcp-http==1.1.2Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0