Advisory

PYSEC-2026-3411

Also known as: CVE-2026-25960, GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536

Summary

vLLM has SSRF Protection Bypass

Details

Summary

The SSRF protection fix for https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc can be bypassed in the load_from_url_async method due to inconsistent URL parsing behavior between the validation layer and the actual HTTP client.

Affected Component

  • File: vllm/connections.py
  • Function: load_from_url_async

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The SSRF fix uses urllib3.util.parse_url() to validate and extract the hostname from user-provided URLs. However, load_from_url_async uses aiohttp for making the actual HTTP requests, and aiohttp internally uses the yarl library for URL parsing.

These two URL parsers handle backslash characters (\) differently:

| Parser | Input URL | Parsed Host | Parsed Path | Behavior |
|--------|-----------|-------------|-------------|----------|
| urllib3.parse_url() | https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/ | httpbin.org | /%[email protected]/ | URL-encodes \ as %5C, treats \@evil.com/ as part of the path |
| yarl (via aiohttp) | https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/ | evil.com | / | Treats \ as part of userinfo (user: httpbin.org\), the @ acts as the userinfo/host separator |

Attack Scenario

# Attacker provides this URL
malicious_url = "https://httpbin.org\\@evil.com/"

# 1. Validation layer (urllib3.parse_url)
parsed = urllib3.util.parse_url(malicious_url)
# parsed.host == "httpbin.org"  ✅ Passes validation

# 2. Actual request (aiohttp with yarl)
async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
    async with session.get(malicious_url) as response:
        # Request actually goes to evil.com!  ❌ Bypass!

Why This Happens

  1. yarl: Interprets httpbin.org\ as the userinfo component, and @ as the userinfo/host separator, so the URL is parsed as user=httpbin.org\, host=evil.com, path=/
  2. urllib3: URL-encodes the backslash as %5C, so \@evil.com/ becomes /%[email protected]/ which is treated as part of the path, leaving host=httpbin.org

This inconsistency allows an attacker to:

  • Bypass the hostname allowlist check
  • Access arbitrary internal/external services
  • Perform full SSRF attacks

Fixes

  • https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/34743

Severity

Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 5.4, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L

Dates

Published
2026-07-13 14:36 UTC
Modified
2026-07-13 16:32 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

vllm

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.15.1, fixed 0.17.0 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

0.17.0

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.17.0
    pip install --upgrade vllm==0.17.0

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Source

Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences