Advisory

PYSEC-2026-3426

Also known as: CVE-2026-43901, GHSA-3r68-x3xc-rxpg

Summary

wireshark-mcp vulnerable to arbitrary file write via export_objects when WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is not configured

Details

Description

Impact

wireshark-mcp exposes a wireshark_export_objects MCP tool that accepts an attacker-controlled dest_dir parameter and passes it to tshark's --export-objects flag with no mandatory path restriction.

The path sandbox (_allowed_dirs) is None by default and only activates when the environment variable WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is explicitly set. In a default installation, any directory on the filesystem can be used as the export destination.

Affected code (src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py:531-543):


output_validation = self._validate_output_path(dest_dir)

# _validate_output_path only enforces the sandbox when _allowed_dirs is set.

# Default: _allowed_dirs = None → no restriction.

os.makedirs(dest_dir, exist_ok=True)   # creates arbitrary directories

cmd = [..., "--export-objects", f"{protocol},{dest_dir}"]

Attack Scenario

An attacker embeds a crafted HTTP response in a pcap file (e.g. Content-Disposition: filename=authorized_keys). Via prompt injection in the pcap payload, an AI model using this MCP server is manipulated into calling wireshark_export_objects with:


dest_dir=/home/user/.ssh/

tshark then extracts and writes the HTTP object to that path, granting the attacker SSH access.

The same technique can target:

  • /etc/cron.d/
  • Writable web roots
  • Other sensitive filesystem locations

Additional Affected Operations

The same missing sandbox affects:

  • merge_pcap_files
  • editcap_trim
  • editcap_split
  • editcap_time_shift
  • editcap_deduplicate
  • text2pcap_import

Proof of Concept

Confirmed on wireshark-mcp v1.1.5 with tshark 4.6.4.

A crafted pcap’s HTTP object was successfully written to an arbitrary filesystem path when:


_allowed_dirs = None

---

Patches

Not yet patched.

A fix should make the path sandbox mandatory for all file-write operations rather than optional:


# Reject all write operations when no sandbox is configured

if not self._allowed_dirs:

    return json.dumps({

        "success": False,

        "error": {

            "type": "SecurityError",

            "message": "Set WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS before using file-write operations"

        }

    })

---

Workarounds

Set WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS to a restricted safe directory before starting the server:


export WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS=/tmp/wireshark_mcp_safe

This activates the existing sandbox and blocks writes outside the allowed path.

---

Resources

  • Vulnerable code:
  • src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py lines 521–543
  • src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py lines 685–839
  • CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
  • CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path

Severity

Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 6.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Dates

Published
2026-07-13 15:15 UTC
Modified
2026-07-13 16:33 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

wireshark-mcp

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, last affected 1.1.5 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences