wireshark-mcp
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected1.1.5(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-43901, GHSA-3r68-x3xc-rxpg
wireshark-mcp vulnerable to arbitrary file write via export_objects when WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is not configured
Description
Impact
wireshark-mcp exposes a wireshark_export_objects MCP tool that accepts an attacker-controlled dest_dir parameter and passes it to tshark's --export-objects flag with no mandatory path restriction.
The path sandbox (_allowed_dirs) is None by default and only activates when the environment variable WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is explicitly set. In a default installation, any directory on the filesystem can be used as the export destination.
Affected code (src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py:531-543):
output_validation = self._validate_output_path(dest_dir)
# _validate_output_path only enforces the sandbox when _allowed_dirs is set.
# Default: _allowed_dirs = None → no restriction.
os.makedirs(dest_dir, exist_ok=True) # creates arbitrary directories
cmd = [..., "--export-objects", f"{protocol},{dest_dir}"]
Attack Scenario
An attacker embeds a crafted HTTP response in a pcap file (e.g. Content-Disposition: filename=authorized_keys). Via prompt injection in the pcap payload, an AI model using this MCP server is manipulated into calling wireshark_export_objects with:
dest_dir=/home/user/.ssh/
tshark then extracts and writes the HTTP object to that path, granting the attacker SSH access.
The same technique can target:
/etc/cron.d/Additional Affected Operations
The same missing sandbox affects:
merge_pcap_fileseditcap_trimeditcap_spliteditcap_time_shifteditcap_deduplicatetext2pcap_importProof of Concept
Confirmed on wireshark-mcp v1.1.5 with tshark 4.6.4.
A crafted pcap’s HTTP object was successfully written to an arbitrary filesystem path when:
_allowed_dirs = None
---
Patches
Not yet patched.
A fix should make the path sandbox mandatory for all file-write operations rather than optional:
# Reject all write operations when no sandbox is configured
if not self._allowed_dirs:
return json.dumps({
"success": False,
"error": {
"type": "SecurityError",
"message": "Set WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS before using file-write operations"
}
})
---
Workarounds
Set WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS to a restricted safe directory before starting the server:
export WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS=/tmp/wireshark_mcp_safe
This activates the existing sandbox and blocks writes outside the allowed path.
---
Resources
src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py lines 521–543src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py lines 685–839Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 6.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
0, last affected 1.1.5 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0