praisonai
Affected
- introduced
3.8.1, fixed4.6.59(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.6.59
Fix
- Fixed version
4.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.59
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-56833, GHSA-22cj-m4wf-fv2c
PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal
PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal
Summary
PraisonAI's Dynamic Context module provides filesystem-backed history and
terminal-log storage. The SDK reference describes the module as providing:
The module also exports agent-callable tool factories:
create_history_tools() returns history_search, history_tail, and history_get.create_terminal_tools() returns terminal_tail, terminal_grep, and terminal_commands.Those tools accept run_id and agent_id arguments from the tool caller. The
underlying stores join those values into filesystem paths without rejecting
absolute paths or .. traversal:
history_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "history"
return history_dir / f"{agent_id}.jsonl"
terminal_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "terminal"
return terminal_dir / f"{agent_id}.log"
Because run_id can be an absolute path and agent_id can contain traversal,
a lower-trust prompt/user that can call these tools can read .jsonl and.log files outside the configured Dynamic Context base directory.
Affected Product
MervinPraison/PraisonAIpippraisonaisrc/praisonai/praisonai/context/history_store.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/context/terminal_logger.py4.6.58origin/main validated: 1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3eorigin/main tag validated: v4.6.58Suggested affected range:
pip:praisonai >= 3.8.1, <= 4.6.58
Representative local sweep:
3.8.1: vulnerable4.0.0: vulnerable4.5.113: vulnerable4.6.33: vulnerable4.6.34: vulnerable4.6.40: vulnerable4.6.50: vulnerable4.6.58: vulnerableRoot Cause
HistoryStore._get_history_path() and TerminalLogger._get_log_path() treat
logical identifiers as path segments, but never validate that the resolved path
stays under base_dir.
History path construction:
def _get_history_path(self, run_id: str, agent_id: str) -> Path:
history_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "history"
history_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return history_dir / f"{agent_id}.jsonl"
Terminal path construction:
def _get_log_path(self, run_id: str, agent_id: str) -> Path:
terminal_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "terminal"
terminal_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return terminal_dir / f"{agent_id}.log"
The agent tools pass caller-controlled run_id and agent_id directly into
these helpers:
def history_tail(agent_id: str = "default", run_id: str = "default", count: int = 10) -> str:
messages = history_store.get_last_messages(agent_id=agent_id, run_id=run_id, count=count)
def terminal_tail(agent_id: str = "default", run_id: str = "default", lines: int = 50) -> str:
return term_logger.tail_session(agent_id=agent_id, run_id=run_id, lines=lines)
There is no check equivalent to:
resolved = candidate.resolve()
base = self.base_dir.resolve()
resolved.relative_to(base)
There is also no identifier allowlist preventing /, \, or .. inrun_id or agent_id.
Local PoV
Run against the latest PyPI package:
uv run --with 'praisonai==4.6.58' \
python poc/pov_prai_cand_027_history_terminal_tools_path_traversal.py --json
The PoV:
secret.jsonl and secret.log.history_tail() and history_get() with run_id=<outside-dir> and agent_id=../secret.terminal_tail() and terminal_grep() with the same traversal.Observed output summary from evidence/pov-pypi-4.6.58.json:
{
"package": "praisonai",
"package_version": "4.6.58",
"controls": {
"valid_history_read_works": true,
"valid_terminal_read_works": true,
"outside_history_file_outside_base_dir": true,
"outside_terminal_file_outside_base_dir": true,
"traversal_history_path_resolves_to_outside_file": true,
"traversal_terminal_path_resolves_to_outside_file": true
},
"outside_history_tail": "Last 1 messages:\\n\\n[system]: PRAI-CAND-027-HISTORY-SECRET",
"outside_terminal_tail": "PRAI-CAND-027-TERMINAL-SECRET\\nsecond line\\n",
"outside_terminal_grep": "Found 1 matches:\\n\\n--- Line 1 ---\\n> PRAI-CAND-027-TERMINAL-SECRET\\n second line",
"vulnerable": true
}
The PoV is local-only. It does not start a server, contact a third-party
target, or use real credentials.
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
This report does not claim that history and terminal helpers should be unable
to read legitimate history or terminal logs. The issue is narrower: logicalrun_id and agent_id values can escape the configured Dynamic Context base
directory.
The controls show the intended boundary:
.jsonl and .log files are not under the configured base_dir; andThe official context reference describes history persistence and terminal
logging as filesystem-backed Dynamic Context features. The context security
documentation also treats absolute paths, path traversal, and sensitive files
as privacy/security risks. Reading files outside the configured context store
conflicts with that documented boundary.
Impact
If a PraisonAI application exposes these Dynamic Context tools to untrusted or
lower-trust prompts, the lower-trust caller can read files outside the
configured context storage when the target file can be reached with the
tool-imposed suffix:
history_* tools can disclose reachable .jsonl files;terminal_* tools can disclose reachable .log files; andThis can expose conversation history, prompts, terminal output, command logs,
tokens, API keys, cloud credentials, operational data, or other secrets stored
in JSONL/log files readable by the PraisonAI process.
The impact is confidentiality-only in the tested surface. Integrity and
availability are not claimed for this report.
Severity
Suggested severity: High.
Rationale:
AV: applies when an application exposes an agent with these tools over a network chat/API surface.AC: the traversal needs only chosen run_id and agent_id values.PR: an unauthenticated or public-facing agent endpoint can be exploited without an account. Deployments that require authenticated chat/API access may score this as PR:L.UI: the attacker directly supplies the prompt/tool argument to the exposed agent surface.C: conversation history and terminal logs can contain secrets and private operational data.I:N/A: this report demonstrates read-only disclosure.High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.5, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
3.8.1, fixed 4.6.59 (ecosystem)4.6.59
4.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.59Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0