Details
Suggested Fix
Escape every untrusted value before inserting it into the approval HTML:
tool_namerisk_levelagent_name- every argument key
- every argument value
For example, use html.escape(str(value), quote=True) or a template engine that
auto-escapes by default. Add regression tests that include </code><script>...
in tool arguments and assert that the rendered page contains escaped text, not a
script element.
Minimal patch shape:
from html import escape
def h(value: object) -> str:
return escape(str(value), quote=True)
tool_name = h(info.get("tool_name", "unknown"))
risk_level = h(info.get("risk_level", "unknown"))
agent_name = h(info.get("agent_name", ""))
args_html = ""
for k, v in arguments.items():
val_str = str(v)
if len(val_str) > 200:
val_str = val_str[:197] + "..."
args_html += (
f"<tr><td><code>{h(k)}</code></td>"
f"<td><code>{h(val_str)}</code></td></tr>"
)
Additional hardening:
- avoid inline JavaScript and add a restrictive Content Security Policy;
- keep the request id as an unguessable capability, but do not rely on it as an XSS defense;
- consider requiring a per-request decision token outside attacker-controlled rendered argument fields.