Details
and child_output.get("network_reply") == "local-ok"
)
return {
"repo": str(repo),
"has_sandlock": True,
"sandbox_type": sandbox.sandbox_type,
"sandlock_available": sandbox.is_available,
"configured_allowed_paths": config.security_policy.allowed_paths,
"configured_network": config.security_policy.allow_network,
"outside_path_under_allowed": str(outside).startswith(str(allowed) + os.sep),
"status": getattr(result.status, "name", str(result.status)),
"exit_code": result.exit_code,
"stdout": result.stdout.strip(),
"stderr": result.stderr.strip(),
"error": result.error,
"child_output": child_output,
"accepted_local_payload": accepted_payload,
"vulnerable": vulnerable,
}
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("--repo", required=True, type=pathlib.Path)
args = parser.parse_args()
result = asyncio.run(run_pov(args.repo.resolve()))
print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
if result.get("has_sandlock") and not result.get("vulnerable"):
return 1
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
## PoC
The PoV section above contains the local reproduction command, input, and decisive output.
## Impact
If a PraisonAI user or service relies on `SandlockSandbox` / native sandboxing for untrusted code isolation on a host without the required Landlock support, code submitted to the sandbox can execute with the host user's normal filesystem and network access.
Concrete impact includes:
- reading files outside the configured tenant/workspace path;
- reading project files, credentials, `.env` files, SSH material, or cloud config reachable by the PraisonAI process user;
- connecting to loopback or internal services despite `network=False`;
- moving from sandboxed code execution to unsandboxed host-user code execution in deployments that treat Sandlock as the isolation boundary.
The local PoV does not read real sensitive files or contact external systems. It uses temporary tenant directories and a localhost TCP listener.
## Suggested Fix
Fail closed when the requested native sandbox boundary cannot be enforced.
Recommended changes:
1. In `SandlockSandbox.execute()` and `run_command()`, return a failed `SandboxResult` or raise a clear runtime error when `self.is_available` is false.
2. If fallback behavior is kept for developer convenience, require an explicit opt-in such as `allow_degraded=True` or `fallback="subprocess"` and surface that degraded state in the result metadata.
3. Do not preserve `sandbox_type == "sandlock"` in status metadata when the actual execution backend is subprocess.
4. Add regression tests proving that unavailable Landlock does not execute code unless degraded fallback was explicitly requested.
5. Add tests that a native policy with `network=False` and a restricted path cannot read outside-path canaries or connect to a localhost listener.
6. Document the required kernel/ABI versions and the exact degraded-mode semantics.
## Affected Package/Versions
- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`
- Package: `praisonai`
- Component: `src/praisonai/praisonai/sandbox/sandlock.py`
- Related config component: `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/sandbox/config.py`
- Latest verified release/current head: `v4.6.58`, `1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e`
Confirmed affected:
```text
v4.5.110 vulnerable
v4.5.120 vulnerable
v4.6.58 vulnerable
current vulnerable
Negative control:
v4.5.109 not affected because SandlockSandbox is absent
Suggested affected range: >= 4.5.110, <= 4.6.58.
No fixed version is known at submission time.
Version Sweep
version has_sandlock sandlock_available status outside_read network_reply vulnerable
praisonai-v4.5.109 false false
praisonai-v4.5.110 true false COMPLETED TENANT_B_CANARY local-ok true
praisonai-v4.6.58 true false COMPLETED TENANT_B_CANARY local-ok true
praisonai-current true false COMPLETED TENANT_B_CANARY local-ok true
GitHub history for sandlock.py shows the backend was introduced in 4ee7d298c89f on 2026-04-01 with "graceful fallback to SubprocessSandbox", then updated in 7ae6c6d19c31 on 2026-04-02 to use the current Landlock ABI check.
Advisory History
Nearby advisories are distinct:
GHSA-r4f2-3m54-pp7q/CVE-2026-34955:SubprocessSandboxshell command escape through4.5.96.GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh,GHSA-qf73-2hrx-xprp,GHSA-6vh2-h83c-9294:execute_code()Python sandbox escapes.GHSA-ch89-h4r2-c8f8: agent tools workspace escape via symlinks.GHSA-gcq3-mfvh-3x25: PraisonAI Code agent tool workspace fail-open.
This report covers a different root cause: SandlockSandbox / native sandbox policy downgrade when Landlock is unavailable. It reproduces on the latest release v4.6.58, while the older SubprocessSandbox shell escape advisory was fixed at 4.5.97.