praisonai
Affected
- introduced
4.6.56, fixed4.6.59(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.6.59
Fix
- Fixed version
4.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.59
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-56837, GHSA-fc26-m9pf-v56q
PraisonAI LinearBot processes unsigned webhooks when LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET is missing
PraisonAI LinearBot processes unsigned webhooks when LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET is missing
Summary
PraisonAI's LinearBot starts a public webhook listener on 0.0.0.0 and treatsLINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET as optional. When the secret is absent, startup only logs
a warning and _handle_webhook() skips Linear-Signature verification entirely.
An unauthenticated network caller who can reach the webhook endpoint can submit
a forged Linear-Event: AgentSession request. The forged request is parsed,
scheduled for background processing, dispatched to _handle_agent_session(),
and passed into BotSessionManager.chat(). The bot then attempts to post the
agent response back to Linear under the configured bot token.
The local PoV is offline and deterministic. It does not contact Linear. It calls
the webhook handler directly, monkey-patches the outbound Linear comment path,
and proves both sides of the boundary:
200, invokes the agent session path once, and attempts one Linear comment;401 and do not invoke the agent;200 and invokes the agent, proving the control path still works.Affected Product
MervinPraison/PraisonAIpraisonaisrc/praisonai/praisonai/bots/linear.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/bots_cli.pyValidated affected:
main / latest observed release v4.6.58: 1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1v4.6.57v4.6.56v4.5.50Sampled tags where the LinearBot component was not present:
v4.5.49v4.5.51v4.6.9v4.6.10Suggested affected range: LinearBot-bearing releases with the fail-open
signature behavior, at least 4.5.50 and >= 4.6.56, <= 4.6.58. The
component appears non-contiguously in sampled tags, so maintainers should
confirm the exact packaged version history before publishing a final range.
Root Cause
LinearBot.__init__() accepts an empty signing secret and falls back to an
empty environment value:
self._signing_secret = signing_secret or os.environ.get("LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "")
start() treats the missing secret as a warning instead of refusing to expose
the webhook listener:
if not self._signing_secret:
logger.warning("LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET not set - webhook signatures will not be verified")
self._site = web.TCPSite(self._runner, "0.0.0.0", self._webhook_port)
_handle_webhook() only verifies the request if the secret is truthy:
if self._signing_secret:
signature = request.headers.get("Linear-Signature", "")
if not self._verify_signature(raw_body, signature):
return web.Response(status=401, text="Invalid signature")
With no secret configured, the code continues to JSON parsing, accepts a caller
supplied webhookTimestamp, reads the caller supplied Linear-Event header,
and schedules processing:
event_type = request.headers.get("Linear-Event", "")
task = asyncio.create_task(self._process_webhook(event_type, body))
return web.Response(status=200, text="OK")
For AgentSession, the forged body is routed to the agent:
if event_type == "AgentSession":
await self._handle_agent_session(body)
...
response = await self._session_mgr.chat(self._agent, user_id, message.content)
await self._send_comment(...)
The CLI has the same fail-open posture: start_linear() loadsLINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET, prints a warning when it is missing, then reports a
public http://0.0.0.0:<port>/webhook endpoint with verification disabled.
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
PraisonAI's Linear Bot documentation tells operators to setLINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET, pass it to praisonai bot linear, copy the Linear
webhook signing secret, and use it for HMAC-SHA256 verification. The same page
says missing secrets disable signature verification, while its best-practices
section says webhook secrets ensure authenticity.
Linear's webhook documentation says receivers should ensure requests were sent
by Linear by verifying the Linear-Signature HMAC over the raw body, then
checking that webhookTimestamp is recent. The timestamp check alone is not an
authentication boundary because an attacker can supply a current timestamp in a
forged body.
The implementation itself also confirms the intended boundary: when a secret is
configured, missing and bad signatures are rejected before agent dispatch. The
bug is the missing-secret fail-open mode on a public webhook server, not the
signature algorithm.
Local PoV
Run against the latest observed release checkout:
python3 submission-bundle/praisonai-prai-cand-013-linear-webhook-signature-fail-open/poc/pov_prai_cand_013_linear_webhook_signature_fail_open.py --repo artifacts/repos/praisonai-v4.6.58
Expected output includes:
{
"candidate": "PRAI-CAND-013",
"ok": true,
"cases": {
"no_secret_unsigned_forged_webhook": {
"http_status": 200,
"signing_secret_configured": false,
"session_calls": [
{
"user_id": "linear-system",
"content": "Issue: Forged Linear AgentSession event\n\nPRAI-CAND-013 local forged webhook payload"
}
],
"sent_comments": [
{
"issue_id": "issue-prai-cand-013",
"comment": "agent response",
"session_id": "prai-cand-013-session"
}
]
},
"secret_missing_signature_control": {
"http_status": 401,
"session_calls": []
},
"secret_bad_signature_control": {
"http_status": 401,
"session_calls": []
},
"secret_valid_signature_control": {
"http_status": 200,
"session_calls": [
{
"user_id": "linear-system"
}
]
}
}
}
Stored evidence:
evidence/pov-v4.6.58.jsonevidence/pov-live-main-v4.6.58.jsonevidence/pov-current-head.jsonevidence/version-sweep.tsvImpact
If a PraisonAI operator starts LinearBot with a Linear token but omitsLINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET, any network caller that can reach the webhook endpoint
can spoof Linear webhook events and invoke the configured agent through the
Linear integration.
For the AgentSession event path, this lets the attacker supply issue title and
description content that becomes the agent input. Depending on the configured
agent and tools, this can cause unauthorized LLM/tool execution, consume paid
model quota, create or update Linear comments under the bot identity, and drive
the bot into workflows intended only for authenticated Linear events.
This report does not claim arbitrary code execution by default. The concrete
boundary crossed is unauthenticated remote agent invocation through a forged
Linear webhook.
Suggested Fix
Fail closed for public webhook listeners:
High Basis: CVSS v3 score 8.6, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L
4.6.56, fixed 4.6.59 (ecosystem)4.6.59
4.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.59Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0