praisonai
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.6.59(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.6.59
Fix
- Fixed version
4.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.59
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-57127, GHSA-j4hj-7hfh-g2f4
praisonai: recipe serve auth middleware silently disables itself when no secret is set
praisonai: recipe serve authentication middleware silently disables itself when no secret is set
Researcher: Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial & Offensive Security Research
Target: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
---
Package: praisonai on PyPI
Version tested: 4.6.48.
File: praisonai/recipe/serve.py (sha256 491bf8f29e399418260810ba4bf0f6802c6e4aa675628e2be68a9726c15d9b23).
---
TL;DR
praisonai/recipe/serve.py:312-410 defines two auth middlewares (APIKeyAuthMiddleware, JWTAuthMiddleware). Both contain the same "fail open when the secret is unset" branch at the top of their dispatch:
async def dispatch(self, request, call_next):
if request.url.path == "/health":
return await call_next(request)
expected_key = api_key or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_API_KEY")
if not expected_key:
# No key configured, allow request
return await call_next(request)
...
async def dispatch(self, request, call_next):
if request.url.path == "/health":
return await call_next(request)
secret = jwt_secret or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET")
if not secret:
return await call_next(request)
...
The realistic mis-deploy:
auth: api-key (or auth: jwt) in their recipe YAML, expecting that line alone to enable auth,api_key: / jwt_secret: value in the same YAML, ANDPRAISONAI_API_KEY / PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET in the environment.The middleware silently treats every request as authenticated and forwards it to the recipe-execution route.
Combined with the praisonai jobs API having zero auth (a separate finding), operators who paid attention to "I have to set auth: api-key to lock this down" still don't get auth on the recipe-serve surface unless they also remember the secret.
Root cause
Expected behavior, after setting `auth: api-key` in the recipe YAML:
"Now my recipe endpoints require an X-API-Key header."
Actual behavior (serve.py:325-333):
- middleware reads `expected_key = api_key or
os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_API_KEY")`
- if `expected_key` is None (neither YAML nor env supplied
one), middleware logs nothing and forwards the request.
- operator's recipe routes accept the request as if it were
authenticated. request.state.user is unset.
Impact:
The middleware's documented job is "validate the API key
against the configured value". The configured-value-is-None
case is exactly the case the middleware should fail closed
on — operator has signalled they want auth. Failing open
silently turns a documented authentication into a runtime
no-op.
Empirical verification
poc/poc.py:
praisonai.recipe.serve module (sha256 491bf8f29e399418260810ba4bf0f6802c6e4aa675628e2be68a9726c15d9b23).PRAISONAI_API_KEY / PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env vars to simulate the mis-deploy.serve.create_auth_middleware('api-key', api_key=None, jwt_secret=None) and instantiates the returned middleware.Request for /runs (the recipe-execution path) with empty headers — no X-API-Key, no Authorization.await middleware.dispatch(request, fake_call_next) returns the sentinel 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)' from the fake call_next — proving the middleware passed the request through without authenticating.auth_type='jwt' — same bypass on the JWT path.Run log (poc/run-log.txt) summary:
[2] auth_type='api-key', no api_key / no PRAISONAI_API_KEY env
middleware.dispatch -> 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)'
[3] auth_type='jwt', no jwt_secret / no PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env
middleware.dispatch -> 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)'
APIKeyAuthMiddleware allowed the request through without an API key.
JWTAuthMiddleware allowed the request through without a Bearer token.
[4] grep '# No key configured, allow request' -> line 333
VERDICT: VULNERABLE
EXIT 0
Impact
The recipe-serve surface runs agentic workflows — same execution posture as praisonai/jobs/server.py but separately configured / separately reached. Unauth access on this surface yields:
Anchors
praisonai/recipe/serve.py:325-333 — APIKeyAuthMiddleware.dispatch silent-bypass branch.praisonai/recipe/serve.py:352-355 — JWTAuthMiddleware.dispatch silent-bypass branch.praisonai/recipe/serve.py:688-694 — call site: auth_type = config.get("auth")
if auth_type and auth_type != "none":
auth_middleware = create_auth_middleware(
auth_type,
api_key=config.get("api_key"),
jwt_secret=config.get("jwt_secret"),
)
Suggested fix
When the operator has signalled "I want auth", refuse to start without the corresponding secret rather than silently degrading:
def create_auth_middleware(auth_type, api_key=None, jwt_secret=None):
if auth_type == 'api-key':
expected_key = api_key or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_API_KEY")
if not expected_key:
raise SystemExit(
"auth_type='api-key' requested but no API key is "
"configured. Either set `api_key:` in your recipe "
"YAML or export PRAISONAI_API_KEY. Refusing to "
"start with a silently disabled auth middleware."
)
...
elif auth_type == 'jwt':
secret = jwt_secret or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET")
if not secret:
raise SystemExit(
"auth_type='jwt' requested but no JWT secret is "
"configured. Either set `jwt_secret:` in your recipe "
"YAML or export PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET. Refusing to "
"start with a silently disabled auth middleware."
)
...
This is the same pattern the sibling praisonai.gateway server applies in assert_external_bind_safe at praisonai/gateway/auth.py:48-54 — refuse-to-start on external bind without an auth token. The recipe-serve surface should do the same.
Steps to reproduce
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAIpoc.py) against the cloned source.Proof of concept
poc.py
"""
PoC: praisonai 4.6.48 `praisonai recipe serve` configures
authentication via a `auth:` field in the recipe YAML. Setting
`auth: api-key` or `auth: jwt` installs APIKeyAuthMiddleware or
JWTAuthMiddleware on the FastAPI app — and the operator's expectation
is that those endpoints now require a valid API key / Bearer JWT.
In reality, both middlewares contain an early-return that silently
bypasses authentication when the corresponding secret has not been
configured (neither via the recipe YAML nor via the
PRAISONAI_API_KEY / PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env var).
"""
import hashlib
import inspect
import os
import sys
def main() -> int:
print('=' * 72)
print('praisonai 4.6.48 — recipe serve auth middleware silent bypass')
print('=' * 72)
# Realistic deploy: operator sets `auth: api-key` in YAML but
# forgets to set api_key / env var.
for env_var in ('PRAISONAI_API_KEY', 'PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET'):
if env_var in os.environ:
del os.environ[env_var]
from praisonai.recipe import serve as serve_mod
src = inspect.getsourcefile(serve_mod)
with open(src, 'rb') as f:
raw = f.read()
sha = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
print()
print(f'[1] serve.py path : {src}')
print(f' sha256 : {sha}')
from starlette.requests import Request
create_auth_middleware = serve_mod.create_auth_middleware
async def fake_call_next(request):
return f"REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path={request.url.path})"
async def driver(auth_type: str, headers=None):
scope = {
'type': 'http', 'method': 'GET', 'path': '/runs',
'headers': headers or [], 'query_string': b'', 'scheme': 'http',
'server': ('127.0.0.1', 8000), 'app': None, 'root_path': '',
}Critical Basis: CVSS v3 score 9.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
0, fixed 4.6.59 (ecosystem)4.6.59
4.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.59Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0