Details
Why this is distinct from known PraisonAI advisories:
- Not the excluded
praisonai serve agents --api-key/agentsauth bypass. This report targetsPOST /api/mcp/connectin the PraisonAIUI host app. - Not GHSA-9gm9-c8mq-vq7m / CVE-2026-34935 or GHSA-9qhq-v63v-fv3j / CVE-2026-41497. Those involve
MCPHandler.parse_mcp_command()command parsing. This finding usespraisonaiui.server.api_mcp_connect -> praisonaiui.features.mcp.connect_mcp_server -> StdioMCPClient. - Not GHSA-pj2r-f9mw-vrcq / CVE-2026-40159. That advisory concerns sensitive environment variables inherited by untrusted MCP subprocesses. This finding is unauthenticated network-triggered local process execution.
- Not GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj or GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq. Those concern unauthenticated legacy/generated agent servers. This is a distinct UI route and a distinct sink that starts arbitrary local processes.
- Not GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj, GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw, or other MCP server file-read/path-traversal advisories. This path is the UI MCP client connector, not PraisonAI's MCP server tool dispatcher.
Recommended Fix
- Remove arbitrary
command/argsfrom the remote HTTP API. MCP stdio servers should be configured only from trusted local configuration, not caller-supplied JSON. - Require authentication and authorization on
/api/mcp/connect,/api/mcp/disconnect/*, and/api/mcp/serversregardless ofAUTH_ENFORCE. - Change UI command defaults from
0.0.0.0to127.0.0.1, or require an explicit--unsafe-exposestyle flag when binding externally without auth. - If remote MCP registration is a required feature, allow only URL-based transports with SSRF protections, or maintain an administrator-configured allowlist of commands.
- Add regression tests that unauthenticated requests to
/api/mcp/connectcannot start a subprocess, including whenAUTH_ENFORCEis unset.