Details
The upstream MCP Python SDK advisory GHSA-9h52-p55h-vw2f / CVE-2025-66416
classifies unauthenticated localhost HTTP/SSE MCP servers without DNS rebinding
protection as a High severity issue because malicious websites can invoke tools
or access resources exposed by the local MCP server. That advisory also says
custom low-level SseServerTransport configurations should explicitly configure
transport security settings when running unauthenticated localhost servers.
PraisonAI's current Streamable HTTP implementation already enforces an Origin
guard and rejects the exact attacker Origin used in the PoV. The issue is that
the legacy SSE sibling path lacks the same boundary.
Suggested severity
Suggested severity: High.
Rationale:
AV: the attack uses browser-origin HTTP requests to a local/internal service.AC: practical exploitation requires DNS rebinding or equivalent browser origin setup.PR: no PraisonAI credentials are required by the SSE server.UR: the user must visit an attacker-controlled page.S: the vulnerable transport exposes tools that operate on resources outside the HTTP transport itself.C/I/A: exposed tools may read, mutate, or disrupt local/internal resources depending on the configured MCP server.
Suggested fix
Bring legacy SSE server security in line with the current Streamable HTTP
transport, or disable the legacy SSE server path.
Recommended changes:
- Add explicit allowed-origin and allowed-host validation to both
/sseand/messages/. - Reject invalid
Originwith HTTP 403 before opening the SSE stream or accepting POST messages. - Validate
Hostfor local and internal deployments to mitigate DNS rebinding even when browsers omit or varyOrigin. - Require authentication for all non-stdio MCP HTTP transports, including SSE.
- Add
--api-key,--allowed-origins, and--allowed-hostsoptions topraisonai mcp runandpraisonai serve mcpwhen--transport sseis used. - Where the installed MCP SDK supports it, configure the SDK transport-security settings for low-level
SseServerTransportusage instead of mounting it without Host/Origin protection. - Consider deprecating or disabling
--transport sseserver mode in favor of the current Streamable HTTP implementation. - Add regression tests proving that attacker
HostandOriginvalues are rejected on both/sseand/messages/, and that current Streamable HTTP and legacy SSE enforce the same boundary.