praisonai
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.6.59(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.6.59
Fix
- Fixed version
4.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.59
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-57122, GHSA-x92v-rpx6-p6cw
PraisonAI: Webhook signature verification skipped (fail-open) when secret unset, allowing forged inbound webhooks (WhatsApp & Linear bots)
The WhatsApp and Linear bot adapters verify the inbound webhook HMAC signature only
when a secret is configured. When the secret environment variable is unset — the
default on a fresh install and common in development — verification is skipped entirely
and the webhook body is parsed and dispatched as a genuine, trusted event. A remote,
unauthenticated attacker who can reach the bot's webhook endpoint can inject arbitrary
platform events.
Affected code:
WhatsApp - src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/whatsapp.py
if self._app_secret: gates the ENTIRE check; when falsy the body is json.loads()'d and dispatched to _process_webhook_data() with no verification.Linear - src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/linear.py
if self._signing_secret: fail-open guard.The _verify_signature implementations themselves are correct (constant-time HMAC-SHA256);
the defect is that verification is bypassed when the secret is absent.
Impact:
The webhook routes require no other authentication, so exploitation needs only network
reachability.
Proof of concept (bot started without the secret - the default):
curl -X POST http://VICTIM:PORT/webhook \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"object":"whatsapp_business_account","entry":[{"changes":[{"value":
{"messages":[{"from":"15551234567","id":"wamid.x","type":"text",
"text":{"body":"attacker-injected message"}}]}}]}]}'
# No X-Hub-Signature-256 header; bot returns 200 and processes the message.
# Linear: omit LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET and POST without a Linear-Signature header.
A self-contained PoC that executes the real _handle_webhook / _verify_signature source
extracted from the repo confirms: secret unset -> status 200, payload dispatched (VULNERABLE);
secret set + no signature -> status 403, nothing dispatched (control).
Remediation:
Fail closed. When no secret is configured, reject all webhooks (HTTP 403) and refuse to start
the adapter unless a secret is set (or an explicit, clearly-named insecure-dev override is given):
if not self._app_secret:
return web.Response(status=403, text="Webhook secret not configured")
signature = request.headers.get("X-Hub-Signature-256", "")
if not self._verify_signature(body, signature):
return web.Response(status=403, text="Invalid signature")
Distinct from prior advisories:
The accepted default-insecure advisories cover a different surface/mechanism — CALL_SERVER_TOKEN
unset (GHSA-86qc-r5v2-v6x6) and the JWT key default "dev-secret-change-me" (GHSA-3qg8-5g3r-79v5).
This is in the bot webhook adapters and the mechanism is skipping signature verification entirely
when the secret is absent, not a weak default key.
High Basis: CVSS v3 score 8.6, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L
0, fixed 4.6.59 (ecosystem)4.6.59
4.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.59Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0