praisonai-platform
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.1.6(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.1.6
Fix
- Fixed version
0.1.6pip install --upgrade praisonai-platform==0.1.6
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-57148, GHSA-f38v-77qj-h4jq
praisonai-platform 0.1.4 still boots on the hardcoded JWT secret dev-secret-change-me (default-open production guard)
Overview
GHSA-3qg8-5g3r-79v5 (Critical) reported that praisonai-platform's JWT signing secret defaulted to the hardcoded literal "dev-secret-change-me", and that the production guard meant to prevent this was default-open (it only fired when PLATFORM_ENV != "dev", but PLATFORM_ENV defaults to "dev"). That advisory declares the issue patched in >= 0.1.4. It is not. The shipped praisonai-platform==0.1.4 (and current main) still resolves the signing key to "dev-secret-change-me" in any deployment that does not explicitly set PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET, because the 0.1.4 change merely duplicated the same default-open guard into a second function instead of failing closed. An unauthenticated attacker reads the literal from the public source, forges a JWT with an arbitrary sub, and is authenticated as that user — including a workspace owner.
Impact
Any deployment that runs praisonai-platform 0.1.4 without explicitly exporting a strong PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET signs and verifies session JWTs with the publicly known key "dev-secret-change-me". The package's documented entry point — python -m praisonai_platform --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000 (equivalently uvicorn praisonai_platform.api.app:app --host 0.0.0.0) — sets neither PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET nor PLATFORM_ENV, so this is the default state, not an edge case. A repository-wide search finds both variables only at the two guard sites and in test fixtures; no shipped Dockerfile, compose file, or deployment doc sets either.
Consequences:
PR:N / AC:L apply to the authentication-bypass primitive: minting a valid session for a known sub needs no account, only the public secret. Targeted takeover of a specific owner additionally requires that owner's user id (readable by any co-member from the member-list response above, or recoverable from logs / prior exposure); this conditions the highest-impact path but not the bypass itself. The vector matches the PR:N/9.8 GitHub assigned the original GHSA-3qg8 for the identical defect.
Technical Details
All references are to src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/... in praisonai-platform==0.1.4 (PyPI sdist) and main HEAD 8acf77c. The two copies of services/auth_service.py are byte-identical — sha256 = cc29d43c5412da2c73c818859b8d8b146587842999b777336017ab9d9e509258 for both the shipped 0.1.4 sdist and the HEAD checkout — so the patched release and current main carry the same defect verbatim.
1. Module-load guard is default-open (services/auth_service.py:25-34).
DEFAULT_SECRET = "dev-secret-change-me"
JWT_SECRET = os.environ.get("PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET", DEFAULT_SECRET)
JWT_ALGORITHM = "HS256"
JWT_TTL_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("PLATFORM_JWT_TTL", str(30 * 24 * 3600)))
if JWT_SECRET == DEFAULT_SECRET and os.environ.get("PLATFORM_ENV", "dev") != "dev":
raise RuntimeError(
"PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET must be set to a strong random value in production. "
"Set PLATFORM_ENV=dev to suppress this check during development."
)
The raise fires only when PLATFORM_ENV != "dev". But os.environ.get("PLATFORM_ENV", "dev") defaults to "dev", and PLATFORM_ENV is set nowhere in the package or its deployment configuration (a repo-wide search finds PLATFORM_ENV only at these two guard sites, and PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET only here plus in tests/ fixtures that set it explicitly — no Dockerfile, compose file, or doc sets either). So in a clean deployment the predicate is True and ("dev" != "dev") = False; the guard does not fire and JWT_SECRET stays "dev-secret-change-me".
2. The 0.1.4 "fix" duplicated the same default-open guard (services/auth_service.py:114-128). Instead of failing closed, 0.1.4 added the identical predicate to _issue_token:
def _issue_token(self, user: User) -> str:
if JWT_SECRET == DEFAULT_SECRET and os.environ.get("PLATFORM_ENV", "dev") != "dev":
raise RuntimeError("Refusing to issue JWT with default PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET outside dev")
...
return jwt.encode(payload, JWT_SECRET, algorithm=JWT_ALGORITHM) # signs with the default secret
GHSA-3qg8 states the intended fix is to "fail-closed at import time when the secret is the default, regardless of any environment variable." HEAD does not do that; both guard copies remain gated on the PLATFORM_ENV != "dev" condition that is false by default. The advisory's own patch threshold (>= 0.1.4) is therefore incorrect — 0.1.4 is still vulnerable.
3. Verification trusts the forged sub end-to-end (services/auth_service.py:131-141 -> api/deps.py:28-73).
def _verify_token(self, token):
payload = jwt.decode(token, JWT_SECRET, algorithms=[JWT_ALGORITHM]) # default secret; alg pinned; exp checked
return AuthIdentity(id=payload["sub"], type="user", email=payload.get("email"), name=payload.get("name"))
get_current_user (deps.py:28) returns this identity directly; require_workspace_member (deps.py:54) authorizes purely from member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, identity.id, min_role) against the forged sub. Decoding is otherwise sound (HS256 pinned, exp enforced by PyJWT, no verify=False), so the only break is the default secret. No middleware or app-factory check re-validates (api/app.py mounts the routers with per-route Depends(get_current_user) and no global re-root).
Critical Basis: CVSS v3 score 9.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
0, fixed 0.1.6 (ecosystem)0.1.6
0.1.6pip install --upgrade praisonai-platform==0.1.6Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0