praisonaiagents
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.6.59(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.6.59
Fix
- Fixed version
1.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonaiagents==1.6.59
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-57129, GHSA-2rcg-mm5h-xchx
PraisonAI: Arbitrary File Read via @file: Mention Path Traversal
Summary
The MentionsParser in src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/mentions.py processes @file: mentions in agent prompts by reading arbitrary files from the filesystem. When a file path is not found relative to the workspace, the parser falls back to using the path as an absolute path without any validation or boundary check. This allows an attacker who can influence agent prompts (via chat messages, Telegram/Discord/Slack bot inputs, or YAML workflow configs) to read any file on the filesystem accessible to the process user.
Details
Vulnerable code (lines 165–178):
def _process_file_mention(self, file_path: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Process @file:path mention."""
try:
# Resolve path relative to workspace
full_path = self.workspace_path / file_path
if not full_path.exists():
# Try as absolute path
full_path = Path(file_path)
if not full_path.exists():
self._log(f"File not found: {file_path}", logging.WARNING)
return f"# File: {file_path}\n[File not found]"
content = full_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
The vulnerability is in the fallback at line 171–172: When the file is not found relative to workspace_path, the code constructs full_path = Path(file_path), which accepts any absolute or relative path without validation. There is no:
.. path traversal checkThe file_path parameter originates from parsing @file: mentions in user/LLM prompts. The MentionsParser is used across the framework to process mentions in agent instructions and user messages.
Contrast with `skill_tools.py` `read_skill_file` (lines 140–193), which properly validates:
# skill_tools.py line 179 — proper validation
if os.path.commonpath([full_path, skill_path]) != skill_path:
return f"Error: Path traversal detected - {file_path} is outside skill directory"
PoC
Setup: Clean checkout at commit d5f1114a.
Positive trigger — arbitrary file read via @file: mention:
import sys
sys.path.insert(0, 'src/praisonai-agents')
from praisonaiagents.tools.mentions import MentionsParser
parser = MentionsParser()
# Test 1: Absolute path read (bypasses workspace resolution)
result = parser._process_file_mention('/etc/hostname')
print(f'Absolute path read: {result[:80]}...')
# Test 2: Relative path with traversal
result = parser._process_file_mention('../../../etc/hostname')
print(f'Traversal read: {result[:80]}...')
Expected output:
Absolute path read: # File: /etc/hostname
```linux
<hostname>
```...
Traversal read: # File: ../../../etc/hostname
```linux
<hostname>
```...
Negative control — non-existent file:
result = parser._process_file_mention('/nonexistent/secret.txt')
# Returns: "# File: /nonexistent/secret.txt\n[File not found]"
Cleanup: No persistence or side effects — read-only operation.
Impact
An attacker who can inject @file: mentions into agent prompts (via chat messages in Telegram/Discord/Slack bots, user input in web UI, or YAML workflow configurations) can read any file accessible to the process user, including:
.env files, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, API keys/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow (if process has read access)This is particularly dangerous in bot deployments where auto_approve_tools defaults to True and untrusted users can send messages containing @file: mentions.
Suggested remediation
workspace_path:def _process_file_mention(self, file_path: str) -> Optional[str]:
full_path = (self.workspace_path / file_path).resolve()
# Ensure resolved path is within workspace
if not str(full_path).startswith(str(self.workspace_path.resolve())):
return f"# File: {file_path}\n[Access denied: path outside workspace]"
if not full_path.exists():
return f"# File: {file_path}\n[File not found]"
content = full_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
.resolve() to prevent symlink-based traversal..env, .git, .ssh, keys, credentials).os.path.commonpath pattern used by skill_tools.py.Credits
High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.5, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
0, fixed 1.6.59 (ecosystem)1.6.59
1.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonaiagents==1.6.59Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0