praisonaiagents
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.6.59(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.6.59
Fix
- Fixed version
1.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonaiagents==1.6.59
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-57123, GHSA-x227-pf99-vffg
PraisonAI: MCP SSE transport binds 0.0.0.0 with no authentication and no Origin validation; bundled SecurityConfig is never wired in
The MCP SSE server started via ToolsMCPServer.run_sse() / launch_tools_mcp_server(transport="sse")
binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and builds its Starlette application with no authentication middleware
and no Origin-header validation. The module mcp/mcp_security.py provides exactly the needed controls
(origin validation, DNS-rebinding detection, auth-header enforcement, a SecurityConfig), but none of
these functions are ever called by any transport — they are dead code. Any host that can reach the
port can list and invoke every registered tool with no credentials, and a victim's browser can drive
the same calls against a localhost instance via DNS rebinding.
Affected code: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp_server.py
debug and routesmiddleware= and no per-route auth/origin gate (lines ~271-289): app = Starlette(debug=self._debug, routes=[ Route(sse_path, endpoint=handle_sse), # "/sse" Mount(messages_path, app=sse_transport.handle_post_message), # "/messages/" ]) uvicorn.run(app, host=host, port=port)src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp_security.py defines but the transports never call:
Impact:
launch_tools_mcp_server(transport="sse") is the documented path for exposing tools over MCP. With the
defaults above it is an unauthenticated, network-reachable tool-execution endpoint. Blast radius equals
the capabilities of the registered tools; with file/shell/code-exec tools this is RCE. With no Origin
check, a malicious page the victim merely visits can rebind its hostname to 127.0.0.1 and issue the
JSON-RPC calls cross-origin against a developer's local server.
Proof of concept:
Static proof (AST analysis of unmodified source):
Check 1 - run_sse(host='0.0.0.0'); launch_tools_mcp_server(host='0.0.0.0') -> EXPOSED
Check 2 - Starlette(...) kwargs: ['debug','routes'] -> NO middleware= (no auth/origin gate)
Check 3 - is_valid_origin / is_potential_dns_rebinding / validate_auth_header / SecurityConfig
never called by any transport -> DEAD CODE
Live exploitation against a running server:
curl -N http://VICTIM:8080/sse
# event: endpoint / data: /messages/?session_id=<sid>
curl -X POST "http://VICTIM:8080/messages/?session_id=<sid>" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05",
"capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"x","version":"1"}}}'
curl -X POST "http://VICTIM:8080/messages/?session_id=<sid>" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"<tool>","arguments":{...}}}'
No Authorization header anywhere. Browser DNS-rebinding variant drives the same calls cross-origin.
Remediation:
Wire in the existing mcp_security.py controls and fix defaults:
Distinct from prior advisories:
The accepted MCP advisories are tool-handler bugs — tools/call path traversal -> .pth RCE
(GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw) and unauthenticated file read via workflow.show/validate (GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj).
This is a transport-layer missing-auth/exposure: the SSE server never enforces auth or Origin validation
and ignores the security module the codebase ships. Closest in spirit to the default-insecure pattern
(GHSA-8444 / 86qc) but a different server and a different root cause (unwired controls, not an unset env var).
Critical Basis: CVSS v3 score 9.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
0, fixed 1.6.59 (ecosystem)1.6.59
1.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonaiagents==1.6.59Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0