onionshare-cli
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.6.4(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.6.4
Fix
- Fixed version
2.6.4pip install --upgrade onionshare-cli==2.6.4
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-54707, GHSA-v833-3823-cmhp
OnionShare Receive mode writes uploaded files even when file uploads are disabled
Summary
OnionShare CLI/Desktop 2.6.3 does not enforce the Receive mode disable_files setting at the file upload sink. When a Receive service is configured as a text-message-only endpoint (--disable-files / "Disable uploading files"), a remote sender who can reach the OnionShare service can still send a crafted multipart request containing file[]; OnionShare writes the uploaded bytes to disk before the route handler skips file accounting.
This affects the shipped onionshare-cli Python package and the desktop application because both use the same onionshare_cli.web.receive_mode request-streaming implementation.
Details
Tested repository: https://github.com/onionshare/onionshare at commit 8cc75e1d7e88bd31f7276733449d412bf71c8999.
Affected product evidence:
cli/pyproject.toml declares onionshare_cli version 2.6.3.desktop/pyproject.toml declares onionshare version 2.6.3 and depends on onionshare_cli from ../cli.cli/setup.py publishes onionshare-cli and includes onionshare_cli.web plus templates/static resources.desktop/setup.py publishes onionshare and exposes both onionshare and onionshare-cli console scripts.Reachable default/common paths:
--receive (cli/onionshare_cli/__init__.py:55-57).--disable-files option is documented and stored in mode settings (cli/onionshare_cli/__init__.py:156-160, cli/onionshare_cli/__init__.py:254-261).receive.disable_files (desktop/onionshare/tab/mode/receive_mode/__init__.py:89-99, desktop/onionshare/tab/mode/receive_mode/__init__.py:246-254).docs/source/features.rst:64).--disable-files and disable_files as the option to disable receiving files (docs/source/advanced.rst:162-163, docs/source/advanced.rst:455).Root cause:
disable_files is set (cli/onionshare_cli/resources/templates/receive.html:51-56), but this is only UI-side./upload route skips request.files.getlist("file[]") and file accounting when disable_files is enabled (cli/onionshare_cli/web/receive_mode.py:96-135). However, by this point Werkzeug has already parsed the multipart body and invoked the custom stream factory.ReceiveModeRequest.__init__() treats every POST /upload or POST /upload-ajax as an upload request and creates a receive directory regardless of disable_files (cli/onionshare_cli/web/receive_mode.py:369-391).ReceiveModeRequest._get_file_stream() creates a writable ReceiveModeFile for each uploaded part without checking self.web.settings.get("receive", "disable_files") (cli/onionshare_cli/web/receive_mode.py:517-540).ReceiveModeFile opens <receive_mode_dir>/<secure_filename>.part, writes attacker-controlled bytes, then renames the .part file to the final filename (cli/onionshare_cli/web/receive_mode.py:272-285, cli/onionshare_cli/web/receive_mode.py:320-346).False-positive screening performed:
secure_filename() is used at cli/onionshare_cli/web/receive_mode.py:111-113 and cli/onionshare_cli/web/receive_mode.py:527-528, so the confirmed issue is not path traversal; the file is written under the configured receive data directory.if not disable_files only affects later accounting/status/webhook behavior; it does not prevent the stream sink from creating and writing the file.disable_text=True showed submitted text was not written as a message file, demonstrating the harness was exercising the settings boundary.Affected versions / patched versions:
2.6.3 at commit 8cc75e1d7e88bd31f7276733449d412bf71c8999. Earlier versions were not tested during this audit.Severity:
Rationale: AV:N because the Receive endpoint is reached over the OnionShare HTTP service; AC:L because a crafted multipart POST is straightforward once the service is reachable; PR:L because the sender generally needs the OnionShare URL/private key unless the receiver intentionally runs public mode; UI:N because no further receiver interaction is required after service startup; S:U because the same local application writes the file; C:N because this PoC does not read data; I:L because the attacker writes unwanted files in a mode configured to reject files; A:L because the bypass can consume disk/storage despite the files-disabled policy, bounded by available disk and operator controls.
PoC
The following safe local proof uses only temporary directories and Flask's local test client. In this audit environment, several runtime dependencies were absent (waitress, flask_compress, flask_socketio, unidecode, stem, qrcode), so the harness stubbed those imports while executing the real receive_mode request parsing and file writing code. No external network traffic was sent and no real files outside temporary directories were modified.
Maintainer reproduction from a clean checkout with normal dependencies can omit the import stubs and run the same test-client setup, or can start a local Receive service with --disable-files and submit a multipart request to /upload-ajax.
Positive setup and trigger:
import os, tempfile, shutil
from io import BytesIO
from onionshare_cli.common import Common
from onionshare_cli.settings import Settings
from onionshare_cli.mode_settings import ModeSettings
from onionshare_cli.web import Web
base = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='os-disable-files-poc-')
data_dir = os.path.join(base, 'receive-data')
os.mkdir(data_dir)
common = Common()
common.settings = Settings(common)
mode_settings = ModeSettings(common)
web = Web(common, False, mode_settings, 'receive')
web.app.testing = True
web.proxies = None
web.settings.set('receive', 'data_dir', data_dir)
web.settings.set('receive', 'disable_files', True)
with web.app.test_client() as c:
res = c.post(
'/upload-ajax',
buffered=True,
content_type='multipart/form-data',
data={'file[]': (BytesIO(b'DISABLE_FILES_BYPASS_MARKER'), 'audit.txt')},
)
print(res.status_code)
print(res.get_data(as_text=True))
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(data_dir):
for name in files:
path = os.path.join(root, name)
print(os.path.relpath(path, data_dir), open(path, 'rb').read().decode())
shutil.rmtree(base)Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 5.4, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
0, fixed 2.6.4 (ecosystem)2.6.4
2.6.4pip install --upgrade onionshare-cli==2.6.4Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0