glances
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.5.6(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.5.6
Fix
- Fixed version
4.5.6pip install --upgrade glances==4.5.6
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-68520, GHSA-4h34-v6r8-mmjc
Glances: as_dict_secure() Value-Level Bypass Leaks Credentials in URL Values via /api/4/config
Summary
Glances provides as_dict_secure() explicitly designed for unauthenticated API access, with a docstring stating it returns "a sanitised copy of the configuration dict" where "Sensitive keys in remaining sections are replaced by '********'". However, the implementation only checks KEY names against a regex pattern and never inspects VALUE content. The documented [ip] config section supports public_api (URL), public_username (login), and public_password (password). While public_password is correctly masked, both public_api (when containing embedded credentials like https://user:pass@host/) and public_username are returned in full to unauthenticated users via GET /api/4/config.
Affected Versions
Glances latest (Docker: nicolargo/glances:latest)
Root Cause
In glances/config.py, as_dict_secure():
_SECURE_SENSITIVE_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"password|token|secret|api_key|apikey|ssl_keyfile", re.IGNORECASE)
def as_dict_secure(self):
"""Return a sanitised copy of the configuration dict.
Intended for unauthenticated API access.
- Sensitive keys in remaining sections are replaced by '********'.
"""
sanitized = {}
for section, options in self.as_dict().items():
if section in _SECURE_BLOCKED_SECTIONS: continue
sanitized[section] = {
key: "********" if _SECURE_SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(key) else value
for key, value in options.items()
}
return sanitized
In glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:
# Line 1294
args_json = self.config.as_dict() if self.args.password else self.config.as_dict_secure()
The [ip] config section documents: public_api (URL), public_username (login), public_password (password).
public_password → matches "password" → masked ✓public_api → no match → returned in full (contains user:pass@ in URL) ✗public_username → no match → returned in full ✗Impact
GET /api/4/config or GET /api/4/config/ipas_dict_secure() exists specifically to protect credentials in no-auth mode but fails to mask public_username and credential-bearing URLs in public_apiPrerequisites
--password (default, no auth)glances.conf [ip] section with public_api containing embedded credentials and/or public_username setEnvironment
nicolargo/glances:latest)http://10.140.200.102:8080Reproduction Steps
docker run -d --name glances-test -p 8080:61208 -e GLANCES_OPT='-w' nicolargo/glances:latest
sleep 20
docker exec glances-test sed -i 's|public_api=https://ipv4.ipleak.net/json/|public_api=https://admin:[email protected]/json/|' /etc/glances/glances.conf
docker exec glances-test sed -i 's|#public_username=<myname>|public_username=myname|' /etc/glances/glances.conf
docker exec glances-test sed -i 's|#public_password=<mysecret>|public_password=mysecret|' /etc/glances/glances.conf
docker restart glances-test
sleep 15
curl -s "$TARGET/api/4/config/ip"
# Returns: {"public_api": "https://admin:secret123@...", "public_username": "myname", "public_password": "********"}
Evidence
See C:/Tools/glances-config-leak-evidence.txt.
Dedup Check
as_dict_secure() value-level filtering gapSuggested Remediation
Add "username" and "login" to sensitive key pattern, and check values for embedded credentials in URLs.
Disclosure Timeline
Reporter
GitHub username: Todor
Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 5.3, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
0, fixed 4.5.6 (ecosystem)4.5.6
4.5.6pip install --upgrade glances==4.5.6Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0