Advisory

PYSEC-2026-3668

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Captured output (glances 4.5.5, Python 3.13, x86_64 Linux):

NEGATIVE CONTROL (escaped {{name}}{{cmdline}}): blocked (expected)
POSITIVE (unescaped {{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}): INJECTED - 'touch' executed

The negative control confirms that the same attacker values under a standard
double-brace template are blocked (chevron escapes &). The positive case shows
the injected touch executing when the template uses two adjacent unescaped
variables: the file /tmp/glances_crossfield_pwned is created by the injected
command, not by the intended logger action.

Impact

  • Arbitrary command execution as the OS user running Glances (frequently root on monitored hosts) whenever an operator uses an unescaped, adjacent-variable action template and an attacker controls two neighbouring stat fields.
  • The same reconstruction reaches secure_popen()'s file-redirection (>) and pipe (|) handling, allowing arbitrary file write and output piping in addition to command chaining.
  • The bypass defeats the dedicated _sanitize_mustache_dict() control that was added specifically to stop attacker-controlled stat values from injecting shell operators.

Suggested fix

Enforce the operator ban on the rendered command string that comes from
template-variable expansion, rather than on the pre-render values in isolation.
One approach that mirrors the existing helper: render each variable, then reject /
neutralise operators in the concatenated result, or strip lone &/redirection
characters that originate from variable data.

def _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict):
    if not mustache_dict:
        return mustache_dict
    safe = {}
    for k, v in mustache_dict.items():
        if isinstance(v, str):
            # Neutralise every shell-significant character that secure_popen
            # can interpret, including a lone '&' that could pair with an
            # adjacent variable to reconstruct '&&'.
            for ch in ('&', '|', '>', '<'):
                v = v.replace(ch, ' ')
            safe[k] = v
        else:
            safe[k] = v
    return safe

Neutralising the single & (and the single > / |) in each value removes the
cross-field reconstruction because no operator character survives on either side
of a variable boundary. Alternatively, sanitize cmd_full after
chevron.render(), or pass the template-derived data as `secure_popen(...,
allow_operators=False)` when the command originates from stat-field substitution.

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot.

Sources & licences